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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the publication of Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
(hereafter: Three Worlds) in 1990, scholars largely agree that the modern welfare state 
comes in (at least) three variants: a social-democratic regime in Scandinavia, a con-
servative-corporatist regime in Continental Europe, and a liberal welfare-state regime in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. While Esping-Andersen’s work has established itself as the 
baseline typology in comparative welfare-state literature, it has also benefited from con-
siderable debate since it was first published. One type of criticism centers on the range 
of the threefold typology, notably with regards to welfare states in the Antipodes (Cas-
tles 1996; Castles/Mitchell 1993), Southern Europe (Leibfried 1992; Castles 1995; Fer-
rera 1996; Bonoli 1997), Eastern Europe (Deacon 1993), and East Asia. 
With respect to East Asia1 we find the debate on whether this group of countries 
forms a variant of the Three Worlds (Esping-Andersen 1996; Esping-Andersen 1997), 
or whether their development can be understood as the emergence of a distinct regional 
welfare-state regime (Kwon 1997). 2 Esping-Andersen (1996: 20) refuses the idea of a 
distinct welfare regime for the region which “deviate[s] markedly from existing welfare 
states”. According to him (1996; 1997), East Asian welfare states – mainly referring to 
Japan – are both globally unique and hybrids of existing welfare-regime characteristics, 
sharing common features with the Continental European (emphasis on familialism, 
aversion to public social services, and occupational segmentation of social insurance) 
and Anglo-Saxon (modest public welfare and dominance of private welfare plans) mod-
els. Japan has ever since remained the only East Asian country to be included in Esping-
Andersen's (1990; 1999) typology, and was neither adequately analyzed nor clearly al-
located to a single regime type. 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the conceptualization of ‘East Asia’ is based on the Western interest on the economic 
achievement in the region since the 1980s. The interest started with the extraordinary economic success 
of post-war Japan and then spread to other Asian countries which were known as ‘newly industrialized 
countries’ (NIC) or the ‘Tiger States’ (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan). During the 
1990s, the interest spread to the second generation of Asian economies known as the ‘Little Tigers’ 
(Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia and Thailand), the third generation of Tigers (Indonesia 
and the Philippines, and to a broader extend also Vietnam), and Mainland China (White/Goodman 1998, 
Hort/Kuhnle 2000, Choi 2007). 
2 See Abrahamson (1999) for an analysis of the ‘welfare modeling business’, as well as Arts and Gelissen 
(2002; 2010) for a summary of the debate regarding Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds typology. 
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In contrast to Esping-Andersen, studies on East Asian welfare states assert that common 
features in the initial phase of welfare-state development in the region set them apart 
from their Western counterparts (Jones 1990; Jones 1993; Kwon 1997; Holliday 2000). 
They agree that welfare states of the region belong to a distinct East Asian welfare 
model, although they do not agree on the precise nature of it (Jones 1990; Jones 1993; 
Goodman/Peng 1996; Kwon 1997; Goodman et al. 1998; Holliday 2000; Aspalter 2001; 
Kwon 2005; Aspalter 2006; Lee/Ku 2007). Most of these studies have mainly been fo-
cusing on capitalist nations such as Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong which experi-
enced enormous economic progress during the 1970s. Recently, some authors also add-
ed the next generation of East Asian countries where rapid economic growth is a recent 
phenomenon such as countries of Southeast Asia and Mainland China (White 1998; 
Hort/Kuhnle 2000; Aspalter 2001; Kwon 2005; Aspalter 2006; Park/Jung 2007). Even 
within this extended view, China is not very often included in the literature and has 
largely been disregarded in the conceptualization of East Asian welfare states. 
Broadening the perspective to include the People’s Republic of China (hereafter: 
China) makes comparative studies even more difficult for as China represents a particu-
lar case in East Asia. The Chinese welfare state certainly offers an interesting case study. 
Politically, China is unique in the sense that it constitutes one of the only five remaining 
communist countries beside Cuba, Laos, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
and Vietnam, while at the same time being the only one that has achieved remarkable 
economic growth (Ringen/Ngok 2013). What is more, since the launching of the eco-
nomic reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China transformed its economic system 
from a centrally-planned to an open-market economy. In contrast to the post-communist 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe, China has maintained its socialist corpus 
(White 1998; Kwon 2009). In spite of this political continuity, China has experienced 
fundamental transformations in its socio-economic structure which had major conse-
quences for its social security system. Under the centrally-planned economy, social wel-
fare was provided via work units and collectives. With market transition, China’s previ-
ous socialist welfare system began to erode, leaving huge parts of the population unpro-
tected. With rising social problems, the communist government began to reform its old 
social security system in the late 1990s. The consolidation towards a more inclusive 
system started towards the end of the century and ever since has been a continuous pro-
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cess. In recent years, the Chinese government has made remarkable efforts towards uni-
versal social insurance coverage, especially in terms of pension and health insurance. 
Despite these socio-economic transformations, very little has been done to classify 
China from a welfare-typological perspective. The authors Goodman and Peng (1996: 
216) excluded China from their discussion on East Asia “because of the very different 
economic course it has followed over the previous forty years”. To the extent that China 
is included, it is mostly seen in light of East Asian welfare-regime traits (White 1998; 
Aspalter 2001; Guan 2005; Choi 2012), whereas to others its classification remains 
open (Hort/Kuhnle 2000). Discussions on the Chinese welfare regime have been based 
more on conceptual classification, rather than following an empirical analytic frame-
work (White 1998; Ringen/Ngok 2013). Analyzing China’s welfare system raises inter-
esting questions about how the Chinese welfare state evolves in the transition from a 
socialist to an open-market economy and, what is more, about what kind of welfare re-
gime is emerging in China. 
OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis endeavors to extend the analytical focus of welfare typologies by integrating 
China into the larger welfare regime debate. To this end, its aims to classify the Chinese 
welfare state according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) theoretical framework of his Three 
Worlds typology. Since the 1980s and even more after the 1990s, a formal social securi-
ty system has been establishing in transitory China, whose basic structures can be com-
pared with those of western societies. Thus, in principle it appears feasible to apply 
western concepts of welfare-state research onto China. The objective is not to incorpo-
rate China into the Three Worlds typology, which would require a comparative analysis 
of China and Esping-Andersen’s original 18 cases by replicating his complex calcula-
tions. Rather, this scholarly project is a case study of China in which the Chinese wel-
fare state is analyzed by means of key welfare-regime indicators and analytical criteria 
in accordance with Esping-Andersen’s theoretical framework (1990). The research 
question is: How can the Chinese welfare state be classified with Esping-Andersen’s 
theoretical framework for his Three Worlds typology? 
In his work, Esping-Andersen (1990: 58) focuses on income maintenance as a wel-
fare state’s traditional and still dominant activity, exemplified by income maintenance 
arrangements towards the social risks of old-age, sickness and unemployment. For the 
purpose of the welfare-regime characterization of China, the primary focus of this thesis 
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rests on China’s pension, health and unemployment insurance systems. These programs 
along with other relevant indicators based on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original 
framework are analyzed in the form of a status-quo-analysis (for the latest years availa-
ble ranging from 2011 to 2015) along three analytic dimensions described below. If 
China shows a high similarity with regard to core welfare-regime components, we may 
conclude that China may belong to an existing welfare model. If it turns out to be diver-
gent from any existing welfare model, then China may more likely display the charac-
teristics of a new welfare regime. 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare-state regimes is based on the operationalization 
of two principles: decommodification and social stratification. He then looks at how the 
provision of social welfare is allocated between the state, market and family. 3 Esping-
Andersen applies these principles by creating statistical indices for decommodification 
and stratification to classify welfare states into three welfare-regime types: liberal (An-
glo-Saxon countries), conservative-corporatist (continental Europe) and social demo-
cratic (Scandinavia). As this thesis presents a case study on China, no indices for de-
commodification or social stratification are calculated. Rather, China’s classification is 
done on the basis of an analytic construct based on (both empirical and theoretical) wel-
fare-regime indicators according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) theoretical framework. 
To this end, the Chinese welfare state is analyzed along the three analytic dimensions – 
decommodification, social stratification, the state-market-family relationship. In order 
to explore decommodification in the Chinese welfare state (Dimension I), available 
forms of income maintenance towards old-age, sickness and unemployment are ana-
lyzed in terms of their accessibility and degree. In order to characterize the effects of 
these social policies on social stratification, the Chinese welfare state is examined for 
key welfare-regime attributes (conservatism, liberalism, socialism) that follow regime-
specific stratification logics (Esping-Andersen 1990: 69) (Dimension II). Finally, the 
allocation of roles between the state, market and family regarding the administration 
and financing of social benefits in the three areas of income maintenance are examined 
(Dimension III). The analysis along these three dimensions provides information re-
                                                 
3 See appendix for Esping-Andersen’s original calculation of decommodification (Appendix I) and strati-
fication indices (Appendix II). 
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garding the welfare-regime traits of China and allows for a classification of the Chinese 
welfare state according to the Three Worlds typology. 
Primary data resources include electronically accessible statistics from national (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics) and statistics from international organizations and databases 
(ADB, OECD, WHO, World Bank, SSA), as well as national government website re-
ports and regulations (MoC, MoF, MoHRSS, NHFPC). Secondary data resources in-
clude scientific literature, journal articles and news articles. 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured into six chapters. It begins with a theoretical introduction into 
welfare regimes and typologies (Three Worlds) and the broader welfare regime debate 
exemplified by East Asian models of welfare, before turning the attention to the state of 
the art regarding the classification of the Chinese welfare state (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 
depicts the evolution of China’s social security system in the context of market transi-
tion. It reviews key economic, labor and social policy reforms at different historico-
political stages with an emphasis on the reform of the pension, health and unemploy-
ment insurance systems. Chapter 4 aims to create a welfare-regime profile of China so 
as to allow for a welfare-typological classification of the Chinese welfare state. Here, 
three analytic dimensions based on the Three Worlds framework are created, by means 
of which the contemporary Chinese welfare state is analyzed towards key welfare-
regime indicators. Each section of this chapter introduces one analytic dimension and 
presents an operationalization of relevant welfare-regime indices in accordance with 
Esping-Andersen’s framework, before constructing a profile of the Chinese welfare 
regime. For each dimension, an interim conclusion is formulated so as to summarize the 
findings. In Chapter 5, I return to focal question underlying this research project by ana-
lyzing the Chinese welfare state in a welfare-typological context. Here, I compare Chi-
na’s welfare-regime profile with Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds and discuss similari-
ties and differences. I further look at the peculiarities underlying the welfare mix of the 
Chinese welfare regime. The aim is to explore towards which of Esping-Andersen’s 
three welfare models China is developing to, and to identify possible unique features of 
the Chinese welfare state which makes it stand out from the Three Worlds. Chapter 6 
draws an overall conclusion, addresses limitations of this research as well as challenges 
and future prospects of the Chinese welfare state.  
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2. INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE REGIMES 
The following chapter presents an introduction into the theoretical foundations of wel-
fare regimes. It outlines the welfare-typological classification of welfare states accord-
ing to Esping-Andersen, whose typology constitutes the basic framework of this thesis. 
It then touches upon the broader welfare-regime discussion in East Asia, before turning 
the attention on the current state of research regarding the classification of the Chinese 
welfare state. 
 
2.1. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
In the literature on welfare regimes we find a number of classifications based on policy 
design. These efforts originate in the classification of welfare states into three models of 
social policy as introduced by Richard Titmuss in 1974. Titmuss (1974: 30-32) distin-
guishes between a residual (marginal role of social policy, liberal), an industrial 
achievement-performance (functional role of social policy, conservative) and institu-
tional-redistributive (identity-creator role of social policy, universalistic) model of so-
cial welfare. Later, this typology was given empirical grounding by Esping-Andersen 
(1990), with some revision in subsequent publications (Esping-Andersen 1996; Esping-
Andersen 1999). Esping-Andersen introduced the notion of ‘ideal types’ into compara-
tive welfare-state research, supporting the idea that welfare states cluster around three 
distinct geographical ‘welfare-state regimes’ defined as follows: 
(…) the concept of welfare-state regimes denotes the institutional arrangements, rules and under-
standings that guide and shape concurrent social policy decisions, expenditure developments, 
problem definitions, and even respond-and-demand structure of citizens and welfare consumers. 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 80) 4 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 2) concept is a critical response to existing theoretical models 
of the welfare state which, according to him, rely too heavily on the misleading compar-
ison of social spending and disregard redistributive characters. He (1990: 19-20) asserts 
that the history of political-class coalitions can be seen as the most decisive cause of 
variations between welfare states. In the first chapter of his book he explains how these 
                                                 
4 Here, the term ‘regime’ “refers to the ways in which welfare production is allocated between state, mar-
ket, and households” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 73). In contrast, the term ‘welfare state’ is much more 
implicit and contestable for as it merely involves state responsibility in securing a basic safety net for its 
citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19). 
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political-class coalitions came about, referring to three ideologies – liberalism, conserv-
atism and socialism – that serve as a starting point for his Three Worlds typology. These 
political ideologies are found again in political parties. This explains their relevance for 
the design of welfare states. To explain how political-class coalitions led to variations 
among welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen (1990: 29) refers to three basic factors includ-
ing the power resources of the labor movement, the capability of left-wing parties to 
form coalitions, and the historical legacy of early regime institutionalization. 
By means of “qualitative different welfare-state logics” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 4) 
he identifies three types of distinct welfare-state regimes: a liberal regime in an Anglo-
Saxon country cluster, a conservative regime in Continental Europe, and a social demo-
cratic regime in Scandinavia. His threefold typology is based on the operationalization 
of three principles: decommodification (the extent to which an individual’s welfare is 
dependent on the labor market), social stratification (the role of welfare states in (re-
)producing societal equality or inequalities) and the relative role of the state, market and 
family in welfare provision5. Moreover, welfare regimes follow different patterns of 
state social policies and programs for distributing benefits, usually differentiating social 
assistance, social insurance, and universal citizenship modes. Each welfare regime has a 
welfare mix in which one welfare provider (and one allocation principle) is dominant, 
either the state (redistribution), the family (reciprocity), or the market (market distribu-
tion). Esping-Andersen’s typology is a classification based upon ideal-types with some 
real types, such as Sweden (social-democratic model), Germany (conservative-
corporatist model), and the United States (liberal model), closely resembling them. The 
key aspects of the three welfare regimes are outlined and described in Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 In response to feminist criticism regarding the conceptual neglect of the family (or household) as an 
essential welfare producer in the welfare mix (Orloff 1993), Esping-Andersen introduces the ideas of ‘de-
familialization’ and ‘familialism’ in his 1999 book Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. By 
including these concepts into his Three Worlds typology, Esping-Andersen (1999: 51) incorporates wom-
en’s perspective into his welfare-state regimes and revisits these in terms of “the degree to which social 
policy (or perhaps markets) render women autonomous to become ‘commodified’, or set up independent 
households, in the first place”. This may be determined through the (non-) provision of public or private 
care services and family policies. As including this extended conceptualization into the theoretical 
framework would go beyond the scope of this master’s thesis, it is not considered further in the following. 
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LIBERAL MODEL 
Within the liberal model (Anglo-Saxon countries) social rights are weak as they are 
extended on the basis of market participation. Public welfare provision and regulation is 
kept at a minimum, as individuals are expected to care for themselves. Liberal welfare 
regimes are dualistic and selective in the sense that they provide highly targeted, means-
tested social assistance programs for the very poor attached with social stigma, whereas 
the better-off rely on private market solutions (such as company welfare and purchased 
insurance and social services). Hence, these residual welfare states are characterized by 
low levels of decommodification, high levels of stratification, as well as low benefit 
levels and weak social rights, which encourage market-dependency. 
 
 
CONSERVATIVE-CORPORATIST MODEL 
In the conservative-corporatist model (Continental Europe) social rights are performa-
tive as benefits depend on employment records and past contributions. The social insur-
ance principle emphasizes equity (i.e. contractual fairness) over equality (i.e. redistribu-
tion). Institutionally, these welfare regimes are characterized by occupationally divided 
social insurance schemes complemented with corporate systems of social service provi-
sion (NGOs and church organizations). The adherence to the idea of preserving status 
differentials makes for a narrow and corporatist sphere of solidarity. As coverage under 
insurance assumes long and continuous employment careers, households depend more 
on the male breadwinner, and thus women’s social rights are typically derived and indi-
rect (Esping-Andersen 1997: 182). This familialistic feature springs from the historical 
legacy of Catholic teachings – especially the principle of subsidiarity – and recent 
Table 1: Three worlds of welfare capitalism according to Esping-Andersen (1990) 
Welfare 
regime 
Degree of 
decommodification 
Degree of 
stratification 
Dominant 
welfare 
provider 
Institutional design 
Liberal Low High Market 
Means-tested social assistance, 
limited social insurance, and 
company-based welfare 
Conserva-
tive-
corporatist 
Medium Medium Family 
Bismarckian social insurance 
programs and NGO-based 
welfare services 
Social 
democratic 
High Low State 
Universal social security and 
welfare programs 
Source: Compiled by author based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Aspalter (2011, table 2). 
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Christian democratic governments in continental Europe. These welfare states are 
unique in that they combine very generous income transfers (to the male breadwinner) 
and very few social (care) services (Esping-Andersen 1997, 1999). 
 
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MODEL 
The social-democratic model (Scandinavia) is committed to universal social rights 
based on social citizenship. Within these service-intensive and highly redistributive wel-
fare states, full employment for both men and women is pursued. The state displaces 
family self-servicing (in terms of care work for children, elderly and sick family mem-
bers) and the market as welfare providers, which results in a highly decommodifying 
welfare state built on the universalistic principle of solidarity. 
 
2.2. Broadening the perspective: East Asian welfare models 
In the course of the 1990s, there emerged a stimulating, yet open discussion on East 
Asian welfare models which go beyond the ‘traditional’ welfare states of the West. 
Stimulated by Esping-Andersen’s study of welfare regimes, scholars were interested in 
what type of welfare regime is emerging in East Asia. East Asia, along with other re-
gions of the world, has for a long time been largely neglected in welfare state research. 
The fast economic growth in these countries drew new attention towards the emerging 
welfare states in the region, especially towards Japan and the four Tiger States. Western 
scholars were interested in the ‘East Asian miracle’ (World Bank 1993), which allowed 
East Asian economies to attain economic growth and stable social conditions (i.e. low 
poverty and inequality rates), while keeping welfare spending low. This section pro-
vides an overview on the classification of East Asian welfare states in the existing litera-
ture, along with their common features and intra-regional differences. 
 
2.2.1. Classification of East Asian welfare states 
James Midgley (1986) was one of the first scholars to identify a common trait of wel-
fare systems in East Asia, which Aspalter (2011: 290) summarizes as ‘reluctant welfar-
ism’. Midgley (1986) argued that on the onset of industrialization, East Asian states 
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adopted a developmental ideology in which governments took a reluctant stance against 
social welfare expansions. His work initiated a series of studies on the political econo-
my of East Asian nations. In the existing literature we find two broad streams of argu-
ments, namely ‘Confucianism’ and ‘developmentalism’ or ‘productivism’, which have 
ever since been referred to when explaining welfare-state development in East Asia. 
 
CONFUCIANISM 
Catherine Jones (1990; 1993) was one of the first scholars to observe an East Asian wel-
fare model which she refers to as ‘Confucian welfare states’. 6  According to Jones 
(1993), the Tiger economies of Southeast Asia cannot be accounted for conservative-
corporatist, although that would be the closest of Esping-Andersen’s regimes. Instead, 
she argues that common Confucian values (e.g. the centrality of family, strong kinship 
ties, paternalism and filial piety) constrained the development of more Western concep-
tions of welfare in East Asia. Jones (1993: 214) describes the Confucian welfare regime 
as follows: 
Conservative corporatism without (Western-style) worker participation; subsidiarity without the 
church; solidarity without equality; laissez-faire without libertarianism; an alternative expression 
for all this might be ‘household economy’ welfare states run in the style of a would-be traditional, 
Confucian, extended family. 
In these family-oriented welfare states, the state largely transfers its welfare responsibil-
ities onto the family, community, and company level, as evident in high levels of three-
generational households, low levels of female labor market participation and company 
welfare in East Asia (Peng/Wong 2010). Her approach is supported with slight differ-
ences by subsequent studies (Gould 1993; Goodman/Peng 1996). Critics of this cultural 
approach argue that a reference to ‘Confucian values’ can be used too arbitrarily since a 
clear conceptualization of the term is missing. For example, before East Asia’s econom-
ic growth, Confucianism was seen as a hindering factor for economic development, 
whereas afterwards it has been praised as the driving force of East Asian development 
(White/Goodman 1998: 7-8). Esping-Andersen (1997: 185) notes that filial piety can be 
regarded as a form of forced dependency due to the lack of alternatives, instead of being 
a pure reflection of cultural solidarity independent of economic needs. Furthermore, 
                                                 
6 Jones (1990) first ascribed the term ‘oikonomic welfare states’ to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan, referring to the Greek term ‘oikos’ which means household economy. She later included 
Japan into analysis and revised her terminology labelling it ‘Confucian welfare states’ (Jones 1993), refer-
ring to Confucianism as distinct developmental and welfare ideology in East Asia. 
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scholars argue that the Confucian approach does not allow for appropriate comparison 
when extending the focus from Northeast Asian to Southeast Asian countries, for as 
these countries differ in terms of their culture and religion. Thus, this approach is ar-
gued to have limited explanatory power in recent dynamic changes and remains static 
(Gough 2004; Choi 2007). 
 
DEVELOPMENTALISM 
In contrast to the Confucian approach, the developmental approach assumes that fun-
damental differences between East Asian and Western welfare states result from politi-
cal rather than cultural conditions. Based on the idea of the ‘developmental state’ (John-
son 1982; Tang 2000), this approach argues that common features of social welfare in 
East Asia stem from a shared developmental ideology of governing elites (Aspalter 
2006). Developmental welfare states are characterized by authoritative governments 
which use social policies to enhance their legitimacy, pacify the labor movement, and to 
enforce social investments into a productive workforce (Tang 2000). Social policies are 
subordinated to developmental objectives and designed to complement economic 
growth (Holliday 2000). The family has a central role in welfare provision, whereas the 
state’s role is more regulative with low direct redistribution, but a focus on investments 
into social development especially in education, healthcare and public housing (Aspalter 
2006). 
 
PRODUCTIVISM 
Holliday (2000) convincingly proposed the existence of an East Asian welfare model, 
which he refers to as ‘productivist welfare regime’. He claims that Esping-Andersen’s 
three criteria (decommodification, social stratification, state-market-family relationship) 
need to be complemented by a fourth criterion – the subordination of social policy to 
other policy goals – so as to distinguish a fourth welfare regime in East Asia. In contrast 
to the developmental approach, Holliday additionally emphasizes exogenous challenges 
in the course of economic globalization. Productivist welfare regimes are characterized 
by a growth-oriented state which deliberately subordinates social policy to the overarch-
ing goal of economic growth. This means, that social policy is either sacrificed to 
productivist objectives or that it can directly contribute to them. This comes along with 
a weak notion of social rights linked to productive activity, social benefits reinforcing 
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productive elements in society, a state-market-family relationship premised on econom-
ic growth and a welfare mix established on overarching economic growth objectives 
(Holliday 2000: 709; see Table 2). Gough (2004) supports this approach and summariz-
es the key features of productivist welfare states as including high health and education 
spending with underdeveloped income maintenance programs. Despite significant wel-
fare developments in East Asia, scholars maintain that the productivist feature still per-
sists and that East Asian welfare states are unlikely to move out of the productivist wel-
fare regime in near future (Holliday 2005; Kwon 2005; Aspalter 2006; Aspalter 2011). 
Against this assumption, Ringen and Ngok (2013: 4) argue that developmental or 
productivist welfare is a static model in that it refers to the early period of economic 
development of East Asian transitory welfare states, which become established in their 
own rights rather than being subordinate to economic policy as economic development 
progresses. 
Table 2: Four worlds of welfare capitalism according to Holliday (2000) 
Welfare 
regime 
Social policy Social rights Stratification effects 
State-market-
family 
relationship 
Liberal 
Neither privileged 
nor subordinated 
Minimal 
Equality of poverty 
for minority; market-
differentiated welfare 
for majority 
Market provision 
encouraged 
Conservative-
corporatist 
Neither privileged 
nor subordinated 
Quite extensive 
Existing status differ-
entials preserved 
Family protected 
Social-
democratic 
Privileged Extensive 
Universal benefits 
graduated according 
to accustomed earn-
ings 
Market crowded 
out; family social-
ized 
Productivist 
Subordinate to 
economic policy 
Minimal; exten-
sions linked to 
productive ac-
tivity 
Reinforcement of 
productive elements 
Premised on over-
riding growth 
objectives 
Source: Holliday (2000, table 1). 
 
2.2.2. Common features of East Asian welfare states 
From these different perspectives of East Asian welfare states, common characteristics 
in the initial phase of welfare-state development in East Asian can be derived: 
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 Social policy expansion of East Asian nations lags behind their economic perfor-
mances (Esping-Andersen 1996). 
 In post-war East Asia, authoritarian governments extended social policies as part of 
nation-building aspirations and regime legitimization, rather than pursuing the egali-
tarian goal of socio-economic redistribution (Wood/Gough 2006). 
 As economic development is supreme in public policy, social policy plays a com-
plementary role to achieving economic growth (Holliday 2000). Redistribution takes 
a rather indirect form in that public expenditures are directed towards social invest-
ment into human capital, especially into education and healthcare (Park/Jung 2007). 
 Institutionally, East Asia welfare regimes are characterized by the dominance of 
occupational social security systems in the form of Bismarckian social insurance, 
provident funds, or a combination of both (Aspalter 2011). 
 The preferential treatment of special interest groups is another feature of East Asian 
welfare regimes, as welfare has primarily been targeted to governmental employees 
(civil servants, teachers, and the military personnel) and only slowly extended to 
other groups (Lee/Ku 2007; Park/Jung 2007). 
 The welfare state in East Asia assumes a welfare regulator role which shows in the 
preference of social insurance programs over more universal programs and low lev-
els of welfare expenditure (Wilding 2008). By doing so, the state tries to minimize 
its administrative and financial welfare responsibilities, thereby maximizing the 
roles of the family and the market in welfare provision (Aspalter 2006; Holliday 
2000; Lee/Ku 2007; Park/Jung 2007). 
 As welfare programs are firstly aimed at male employees in the primary sector, the 
male breadwinner model is preserved (Lee/Ku 2007). 
 East Asian governments explicitly adopted “the strategy of ‘commodification plus 
state regulation’ in welfare provision” (Aspalter 2011: 741). As social rights are 
linked to productive activity, the degree of decommodification is low (Ringen/Ngok 
2013). 
Despite these common features of East Asian welfare states in the initial phase of wel-
fare-state development, there are increasing differences in terms of their developmental 
pathways which are outlined in the following section.  
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2.2.3. Differences between East Asian welfare states 
Despite common characteristics in their initial development, some scholars found intra-
regional differences between East Asian welfare states. Within the productivist world of 
welfare capitalism, Holliday (2000) identifies three clusters which differ in terms of the 
institutionalization of social rights, their redistributive outcomes and the public share in 
welfare provision. In the facilitative regime (Hong Kong), social rights are minimal, 
stratification effects are limited and the market is prioritized in welfare provision. These 
features resemble Esping-Andersen’s liberal model. In the developmental-universalist 
regime (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), social rights are limited to productive activity, 
the position of productive elements is reinforced and the state is of some significance in 
welfare provision alongside the family and market, for as it provides some universal 
programs. Lastly, the developmental-particularistic regime (Singapore) shows minimal 
social rights which enforce individual welfare provision linked to productive activity. 
The state plays a rather directive role in welfare provision alongside the family and 
market (Holliday 2000: 710). 
Hort and Kuhnle (2000), too, find different developmental trajectories of East Asian 
welfare states. Regarding path dependency as a crucial factor, they argue that the colo-
nial past of East Asian countries had a profound influence on the initial characteristics 
of welfare programs by institutionalizing their organizational principles (social insur-
ance vs. provident funds). South Korea and Japan developed German-style social insur-
ance programs, whereas a second group of countries, including Hong Kong (with Ma-
laysia and Singapore), developed a system of provident funds under British authority. 
Park and Jung (2007) find divergences in terms of main program types (social insur-
ance vs. provident funds), contents of welfare programs (e.g. coverage, benefits, and 
financing) and the relative composition of public spending across different social policy 
programs. They argue that these divergences are due to the institutional legacy of their 
first generation welfare programs, as well as the different timing and degree of democ-
ratization experienced in the region. On the basis of this, Park and Jung (2007) identify 
three different country groups in Asia that follow different developmental pathways: 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; Hong Kong and Singapore; Malaysia 
and Indonesia. In Esping-Andersen’s terms, the first group of countries is moving to-
wards a more universal welfare regime with more attention on welfare services albeit 
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the state’s reluctance towards direct financing and provision of welfare benefits. In con-
trast, the second group of countries is moving towards a liberal regime with welfare 
retrenchment, but their reliance on provident funds distinguishes them from the liberal 
model. The third group of countries continues its focus on health and education 
(Park/Jung 2007: 23). 
Kwon (2005) observed that developmental welfare states are diverging between ‘se-
lective’ and ‘inclusive’ welfare states, which differ in terms of the scope of coverage 
and the state’s control over welfare programs. Key principles of the ‘selective’ strand 
include productivism, selective orientation, and an authoritarian political background, 
while the ‘inclusive’ strand features productivism, universal social investment, and 
democratic governance. While Hong Kong and Singapore maintain basic selective fea-
tures, South Korea, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Thailand, are moving towards the 
inclusive type (Kwon 2009). The latter countries followed a productivity-based eco-
nomic development strategy and experienced a wave of democratization in the late 
1980s. 
While studies on East Asian welfare models enhance our understanding of the (cul-
tural, economic and historical) conditions that caused common features of East Asian 
welfare states as well as differences between them, their range remains limited to mostly 
capitalist nations such as Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong which experienced enor-
mous economic progress during the 1970s. Even if the next generations of developing 
countries (such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines) are added, China 
is not always included into the welfare-typological debate. The following section gives 
an overview of the current state of research regarding the welfare-typological classifica-
tion of the Chinese welfare state. 
 
2.3. China in the welfare-typological discourse 
Gordon White (1998) was one of first scholars to apply a comprehensive political-
economy approach to analyze China. In his study on the evolution of the Chinese wel-
fare system under the impact of post-Mao economic reform, White (1998) concludes 
that China is developing towards its capitalist neighbors in terms of an East Asian de-
velopmental welfare model, while it also shows common features with Esping-
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Andersen’s liberal and conservative-corporatist models. He predicts the prospective 
Chinese welfare state 
(…) is likely to be heavily residualist in the sphere of social assistance and Bismarckian in terms 
of social insurance, with relatively privileged sectors (the civil service, professional groups, big-
ger firms in the cities and the urban population generally) and relatively excluded sectors (the in-
formal sector, migrants and the rural population). (White 1998: 193) 
Nevertheless, taking into account China’s distinct cultural, historical, structural and po-
litical characteristics and its complex and rapidly changing economy and society, White 
(1998: 194) predicts the emergence of a welfare system “with Chinese characteristics”. 
Although Hort and Kuhnle (2000) include China into their analysis, this remains for 
comparative purposes only. To them (2000: 179), the ultimate developmental trajectory 
of China’s welfare system remains uncertain, and thus the classification of the Chinese 
welfare state remains open. 
Aspalter (2001; 2006) introduced the idea that the nature of political systems and the 
dominance of conservative political parties were the driving forces of the particular de-
velopmental path of East Asian welfare states. In his extended view of the Three World 
typology, China is regarded as a member of a fourth, ‘pro-welfare conservative’ welfare 
regime (Aspalter 2006). Pro-welfare conservative welfare states are purely conservative 
in nature as conservative political parties and/or conservative social policies shaped 
their development. They are characterized by relatively low levels of public welfare 
expenditure, heavy reliance on the market and family in welfare provision, a welfare-
regulating state with aversion towards welfare dependency and redistribution, a prefer-
ence for occupationally fragmented social insurance systems, the preferential treatment 
of special interest groups, as well as a reluctant stance of the state towards welfare-state 
extension (Aspalter 2001). China seems to constitute an exception among pro-welfare 
conservative welfare states in that the leading political party is not conservative and as 
communist ideologies formed the welfare system of the past. However, as Aspalter 
(2006) maintains, the Communist Party has taken a conservative stance in preferring 
market-welfare provision and being reluctant to extend state-welfare programs, espe-
cially in the 1990s. Aspalter (2001, table 1) describes conservative social policy in Chi-
na as “practical conservatism under the umbrella of theoretical communism emphasiz-
ing both individual and collective responsibility for welfare provision”. 
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Kwon (2005) refrains from simply considering China’s emerging welfare state (along 
with Thailand) as an example of the developmental welfare model. Instead, he (2005: 
20) suggests following further developments in China using the concept of the devel-
opmental welfare state. Referring to Kwon’s (2005) study, Guan (2005) finds two over-
arching social policy reform concerns in China, which follow the selective strand of the 
developmental welfare state as introduced by Kwon (2005). These include the reorgani-
zation of the welfare system to facilitate market transition and the preservation of politi-
cal order. According to Guan (2005), this policy orientation has resulted in a dual social 
policy system with separate welfare systems in urban and rural areas, which is unable to 
reduce increasing inequalities, although it does not worsen them. Moreover, emerging 
welfare programs in China are based on the social insurance principle, which locates 
them closer to the Northeast Asian economies of Japan, Korea and Taiwan rather than 
the members of the inclusive or provident fund model of Southeast Asia such as Singa-
pore and Malaysia (Kwon 2005). 
Choi (2012) regards China as a member of Holliday’s (2000) productivist welfare 
regime. According to him (2012: 284), before China’s market transition in the 1980s the 
Chinese welfare state was characterized “as a socialist system with workplace-based 
welfare in state-owned enterprises, residence-based welfare in urban neighbourhood 
organisations and locality-based welfare in rural areas.” The introduction of neo-liberal 
social policies after the 1980s allowed China to achieve remarkable economic growth. 
As a result of China’s market transition, Choi (2012: 285) argues that 
the Chinese welfare regime has changed from a collective socialist regime based on ‘low wage 
and high welfare’ to growth-oriented productivist regime based on individual responsibility, i.e., 
‘Confucian rhetoric’. 
With a rise in social problems as a consequence of market transition, the Chinese gov-
ernment introduced reforms towards welfare-state expansion in the 1990s. As the needs 
for social policy now correspond with economic and political needs, Choi (2012) finds 
that the productivist feature of the Chinese welfare regime has been significantly weak-
ened. Social policy has started to be regarded as a productive tool in China, although the 
overarching goals of political stability and economic growth have not changed much 
since China’s market transition. But as the dynamic and transitory welfare regimes of 
East Asia are still “in the critical stages of formulating their new welfare regimes”, Choi 
(2012: 291) maintains that the developmental trajectories of these regimes will depend 
on welfare politics based on contingent effects. 
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According to Ringen and Ngok (2013: 17), the Chinese welfare state is, if anything, “a 
hybrid of the least progressive models in previous experience”. Although the Chinese 
welfare state deviates from Esping-Andersen’s liberal model in terms of its welfare stat-
ism (regarding the control of social insurance capital), there is sufficient room for pri-
vate insurance in terms of supplementary pension and health insurances. Yet, they con-
clude that the conservative model seems to offer the best fit: 
The design is cautious, aimed to provide security but on no more than a basic or minimal level, 
with the core mechanism of insurance divided along corporate lines and wrapped into a package 
of more or less traditional Chinese state paternalism. (Ringen/Ngok 2013: 17) 
In sum, these studies come to more or less different conclusions with regards to how the 
Chinese welfare state can best be classified. According to White (1998: 178), China is 
following the developmental welfare traits of its East Asian neighbors which are com-
parable to Esping-Andersen’s conservative-corporatist model, both in terms of their 
ideological motives (regime legitimization and maintenance of social order) and their 
institutional design (corporatist social insurance). But White’s (1998) study refers to 
Chinese welfare developments in the wake of state socialism and – after almost 30 years 
– is outdated. Aspalter’s (2001) study is based on a conceptual framework and focuses 
on developments in the 1990s. To Hort and Kuhnle (2000) as well as Kwon (2005), the 
classification of the Chinese welfare state remains open. Guan (2005) sees China in the 
light of selective developmental-regime traits, whereas in a more contemporary study 
Choi (2012) finds that the Chinese welfare state is moving out of its productivist shell. 
Ringen and Ngok (2013) find, that Esping-Andersen’s conservative-corporatist model 
comes closest to describing the Chinese welfare state. These studies surely offer a fruit-
ful insight into the dynamism and features social security development in China. Their 
discussions are, however, based on conceptual classifications instead of empirical 
frameworks, and what is more, require an update. The literature on the welfare-
typological classification of China remains lean, suggesting that China has not been in 
the center of the research on welfare regimes. This makes the underlying scholarly pro-
ject even more important. Recent reforms towards a more universal and inclusive sys-
tem pose a compelling reason to conduct a contemporary analysis of the Chinese wel-
fare state. Analyzing China’s welfare system raises interesting questions about how the 
Chinese welfare state evolves in the transition from a socialist to an open-market econ-
omy and, what is more, about what kind of welfare regime is emerging in China. The 
following chapter tracks social security development in China under the impact of mar-
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ket transition sheds light onto the complex and dynamic development of China’s wel-
fare system, before turning the attention towards the welfare-typological classification 
of the contemporary Chinese welfare state in chapter 4.  
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3. CHINA’S SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 
This chapter reviews key economic, labor and social policy reforms at different histori-
co-political stages with an emphasis on the reform of the pension, health and unem-
ployment insurance systems. It depicts the evolution of the Chinese welfare state from 
the origins of the socialist welfare system, over the reform of this system in the context 
of market transition and the gradual establishment of a new social insurance system, to 
the present shape of China’s social security system. Tracing major social security de-
velopments in the years from 1949 to 2015 helps to identify distinctly Chinese features 
of social policy making, same as constant and changing characteristics of China’s wel-
fare system. 
 
3.1. Social security development under a centrally-planned economy 
(1949-1976) 
With the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, a centrally-
planned economy was established. In urban areas, foreign and national equity owners 
were expropriated and work units were created. In rural areas, landowners were expro-
priated and land was collectivized. In the course of the 1950s, two separate welfare sys-
tems have emerged in the urban and rural areas of China. 
 
IRON RICE BOWL IN URBAN AREAS 
Under the centrally-planned economy, the communist government assigned jobs to all 
able-bodied citizens by integrating them into different work units (danwei) which in-
cluded state-owned enterprises (SOEs), state agencies, government departments and 
other public-sector organizations. In 1951, the Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS) was in-
troduced as an employment-based social insurance program that protected SOE em-
ployees towards the social risks of old-age, sickness, work injury, disability and mater-
nity. In 1952, the Government Insurance System (GIS) was launched as a public social 
insurance program for employees of governmental and institutional work units includ-
ing government officials, their dependents and college students. Public pension and 
health insurance were organized around work units and catered to SOE and government 
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employees in urban areas. Initially, employees in state-operated, joint state-private, co-
operative and private factories and mines with more than 100 workers and staff were 
covered under the LIS. In subsequent years, the LIS was significantly extended to fur-
ther work units. Coverage increased from 3 million in 1951 to 89 million insured in 
1978, which constituted 94% of the urban workforce or 22% of the total workforce 
(Zhang 2005: 61). The scheme was fully funded by enterprises which contributed 3% of 
their total payroll into the LIS fund that was operated by both enterprises and labor un-
ions. Enterprises were legally obliged to pay 30% of the contributions to the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) which pooled and redistributed the LIS fund at 
the national level.  
Each danwei functioned as a self-providing ‘welfare society’ providing job tenure, 
income guarantee and comprehensive welfare packages to its members. This ‘cradle to 
the grave’ welfare system in urban China based on full employment, income guarantee 
and comprehensive welfare packages became known as the ‘iron rice bowl’ (Leung 
2005). For urban residents outside the danwei system, the state provided limited social 
relief to cover the basic needs of the ‘Three No’s’ (no work, no family, no independent 
means of living) which mainly included childless elderly, disabled homeless and or-
phans. Most of these were received into institutional care such as homes for the aged 
and orphanages. As the size of this population was small, the problem of urban poverty 
at that time was limited (Leung 2006). 
 
COLLECTIVE WELFARE IN RURAL AREAS 
In rural China, farmers were organized into communes based on collective ownership of 
land7. The majority of the rural population, which accounted for 80% to 90% of the total 
population, relied on job guarantee by the collective body. Households were granted 
sufficient amounts of cereal rations by the collectives and a piece of farmland for pri-
vate cultivation. Collective welfare funds were introduced and managed by the produc-
tion group as the smallest collective unit. As resources for these funds were deducted 
from collective net wages, welfare standards depended on the financial and material 
resources of the collectives with significant variations between regions (Bösch 2012). 
                                                 
7 Collective economy in rural China was organized on three levels: first, the people’s communes (ca. 
3000 households), second, the production brigade (ca. 250 households), and third, the production groups 
(ca. 30 households) (Bösch 2012). 
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There were two important systems of rural collective welfare: the Rural Cooperative 
Medical System (RCMS) and the ‘Five Guarantees’ system. The RCMS was the major 
means to provide basic healthcare and to prevent epidemic diseases in rural China, cov-
ering 90% of the rural population by 1970 (Li et al. 2015). It began to develop nation-
wide during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and granted free medical care to rural 
residents. Each collective member paid a certain amount into the health insurance fund 
which was partially funded by the collective welfare fund. The Five Guarantees system 
was funded by rural collectives and catered to the poorest rural residents. Recipients had 
to undergo means-testing by neighbors and benefits were only granted in extreme cases 
with stigmatization of its recipients. Benefits included nutrition, fuel, clothing, housing 
and funeral costs which were granted to collective households and catered to childless 
elderly, orphans and disabled without families. 
 
3.2. Social security development in the course of economic reform 
(1977-1992) 
In December 1978, the Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping launched its economic 
reform and opening-up policy introducing comprehensive reforms towards a socialist 
market economy. As the previous social security system was regarded as an obstacle to 
promoting productivity, the government pursued the privatization of SOEs under the 
slogan of ‘small government and big society’ (Leung 2005). This meant the erosion of 
the socialist welfare system by way of guaranteed access to job or farmland. 
The reforms began in agriculture when collectively-owned land was leased to family 
farmers and the people’s communes were dissolved. The dismantling of collective 
structures meant that farmers could no longer rely on a guaranteed workplace and in-
come distribution by the communes, and thus social security for most farmers evapo-
rated. With the introduction of the household responsibility system in 1979, income 
from agriculture was now returned to individual households instead of the communes, 
which again weakened collective welfare in rural areas. Welfare services had to be fi-
nanced via tax revenues and contributions, so that families had to bear the costs for their 
members’ welfare expenses. The RCMS was left without a base for funding and organi-
zation, and consequently collapsed leaving nearly 80% of the rural population without 
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health coverage (Zhu 2012). Since healthcare was largely privatized, it became unaf-
fordable for the majority of the rural population. 
Due to high rural underemployment, the government loosened the hukou8 system 
(household registration) since 1984, which gave rise to China’s ‘floating population’. 
Millions of rural people migrated to the cities on subsistence wages, without access to 
social entitlements of urban permanent residents. By the end of 1999, the number of 
these ‘migrant workers’ (rural-to-urban migrants working in urban areas) reached 80 
million and has more than tripled ever since (Gao et al. 2012: 1195). 
At the same time, China’s iron rice bowl system posed a heavy financial burden for 
both work units and the central government. The non-contributory nature of the system 
resulted in extremely inefficient welfare provision and unlimited growth of welfare de-
mands. For example, older enterprises had older employees and thus a heavier welfare 
burden to pay out pensions (Huang 2014). With the privatization of SOEs, the full em-
ployment policy was dismantled and replaced by a system of individual contracts as of 
1986. This reform freed enterprises from their employment and welfare responsibilities 
and resulted in massive lay-offs of surplus labor. In the same year, the government in-
troduced a ‘job-waiting’ insurance, providing income support and re-employment assis-
tance to laid-off SOE employees (xiagang gongren). Although the LIS included a form 
of unemployment benefit called ‘job waiting relief’, an insurance against the risk of 
unemployment did previously not exist for as it was seen as a capitalist problem (Leung 
1994). The aim of this new job-waiting insurance was to help facilitate economic re-
forms which would increase productivity and competitiveness by privatizing SOEs. It 
was financed by employer contributions, interest earnings and government subsidies, 
without any contributions by employees. 
Following a series of local pilot projects starting from the mid-1980s onwards, the 
State Council began to develop a two-pillar statutory pension system with defined con-
tributions for urban employees. In its initial stage, the coverage for this pension system 
was low with 55.2% of the urban workforce (or 30% of the urban population) being 
covered (Liu/Sun 2016). Efforts towards pension insurance for rural elderly began in 
1986 when the central government introduced a voluntary social pension system in rural 
                                                 
8 See chapter 5.2. for a description of the hukou system. 
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areas. This was followed by a pilot reform in three provinces in 1991 which were ex-
panded to further rural areas from 1992 onwards. 
The economic restructuring of SOEs ultimately resulted in mass unemployment and 
poverty in urban areas, with enterprises unable or unwilling to pay-out wages and social 
benefits. The poor financial situation of SOEs coupled with mass unemployment result-
ed in a crisis of the danwei-based welfare system and evoked heavy protests throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, a reform of the danwei-based welfare systems was 
launched. 
 
3.3. Social security development under a socialist market economy 
(1993-2002) 
In 1993, the Communist Party issued a general decision on ‘the establishment of a so-
cialist market economy system’ in which social security was defined as ‘a normal sus-
taining mechanism’ and in which the main concepts of a social insurance system were 
outlined (Ringen/Ngok 2013: 8). This included the establishment of a decentralized so-
cial insurance administration, moving from risk pooling from individual enterprises to 
regions (Huang 2015). Employees were for the first time required to pay a share of the 
contributions to social insurance funds. In the same year, the ‘Provisions for Workers’ 
Job-Waiting Insurance in State-Owned Enterprises’ was adopted and coverage of the 
job-waiting insurance was extended to include more categories of SOE workers. 
In 1994, a new Labor Law including various workers’ rights including a minimum 
wage was adopted. 
In late 1998, the central government established the mandatory and contributory Ur-
ban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) with social and individual accounts. 
The introduction of the UEBMI marked a shift from a traditional medical welfare sys-
tem towards social health insurance (Liu/Wong 2016). Although coverage was extended 
to non-state sectors and enterprises, it remained low at only 36% in 2003. As the 
UEBMI was employment-based, coverage was restricted to formal sector employees 
leaving out certain social groups outside this sector (e.g. informally employed, elderly, 
disabled and farmers). 
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In the same year, the Minimum Living Standard Scheme (MLSS) was introduced as a 
means to provide a basic standard of living for urban residents. The MLSS is a means-
tested social assistance program in the poor-relief tradition which grants access to a lo-
cally determined minimum living standard in the form of cash benefits conditional on 
family income. It covers the traditional Three No’s, (unregistered) unemployed workers, 
and low income households whose average family income is below the regional mini-
mum living standard (a local poverty line set by local governments according to ex-
penses for basic necessities including nutrition, clothing and housing). The MLSS is 
administered and funded by local governments with some central or provincial govern-
ment subsidy, whereas applications are processed by local street offices and residents’ 
committees (Ngok 2010). 
In 1999, several projects towards a rural pension insurance system were initiated by 
the State Council and the Asian Development Bank, which intensified in the early 
2000s. This rural pension scheme was a voluntary funded, defined-contribution plan 
which lacked a social pool for as contributions were made into individual accounts. Ru-
ral residents’ contribution capacity and pension entitlements differed significantly by 
region. Rural residents could choose the amount of contributions (2 to 20 yuan) and the 
sequence of payment (monthly, quarterly or annually). Benefit levels depended on the 
size of the pension funds and investment returns. Since this old rural social pension 
lacked adequate funding, it did not succeed in practice (Tao 2016). The number of par-
ticipants in 1999 was 80 million, or 11% of China’s rural population, with a steady de-
crease in participation as rural residents withdrew the payments made from their indi-
vidual accounts. In 2004, only 54 million rural residents participated in the rural pension 
scheme, which marked its failure (Liu/Sun 2016). 
In the late 1990s, all SOEs were required to introduce Re-employment Service Cen-
ters which provided transition for xiagang gongren to move into other employment or 
the job-waiting insurance program. Under the Centers, SOEs remained responsible of 
laid-off workers for up to three years. Enterprises, the government and insurance funds 
each contributed one-third of the funds. Workers received a minimum living allowance, 
which was set in 1998 to be slightly higher than the local standards for unemployment 
relief. The Centers also contributed premiums for social security benefit programs in-
cluding pension and health insurance, and covered expenditures for re-training. 
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The 1999 ‘Regulations on Unemployment Insurance’ officially introduced the concept 
of ‘unemployment’ and ‘unemployment insurance’ (shiye baoxian), replacing ‘job wait-
ing’ (daiye) and xiagang with ‘unemployed’ (shiye) (Bösch 2012: 44). Contributions 
were now required by both employers and employees with shortfalls to be covered by 
fiscal subsidies. Coverage was extended beyond SOEs to include all urban enterprises 
and urban-resident workers except for civil servants. Benefit levels, duration and other 
program aspects were to be determined by local governments according to the local 
situation, which marks a shift away from a unifying national UI standard to a more de-
centralized approach (Vodopivec/Tong 2008). In 2000, the binggui policy was adopted 
after which Re-employment Service Centers were gradually merged with the UI pro-
gram, which shifted the financial burden away from SOEs to employers and employees 
as laid-off SOE workers would now be covered directly under the UI program. With 
these changes, the UI program has changed from a transition measure for laid-off work-
ers to a regular UI program for unemployed workers. 
 
3.4. Social security development since 2003 
In the early 2000s, experimentations with rural pension insurance (2002) and rural 
health insurance (2003) intensified. Between 2002 and 2003, migrant workers were ac-
corded the status of being part of the working class, with rights to equal treatment 
alongside urban residents when applying for jobs. Migrant workers were principally 
granted access to pension insurance in 1999 and work injury in 2002. However, partici-
pation in social insurance programs among migrant workers was very low, with cover-
age rates of only 2-5% in 2002 (Gao et al. 2012: 1195). 
After the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the winter of 
2002 to 2003, the Chinese government recognized the weakness of its healthcare system 
and the need for action. As a result, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) 
was introduced in rural areas (replacing the RCMS) after the epidemic was brought un-
der control. By 2010, the NCMS covered 90% of the rural population in most provinces, 
which according to Huang (2014: 930) was due to huge government subsidies. 
In 2006, the agricultural tax was abolished which previously posed a heavy financial 
burden on farmers. As the rural Five Guarantees system used to rely on collective re-
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sources and was thus essentially a mutual help arrangement, it was unsuited to dealing 
with the new challenges facing rural communities in the context of market transition 
(Zhu 2012: 47). As a response, the MLSS was extended to include rural residents in 
2007. Since the MLSS is a hukou-status based social assistance program, migrant work-
ers are excluded from the scheme as they lack a local hukou-status and thus are not enti-
tled to urban MLSS benefits (Ngok 2010). 
In 2007, the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) was introduced for 
those not covered by the UEBMI (e.g. children, the elderly, disabled and other unsala-
ried urban residents). This new type of residence-based social insurance was a novelty 
in the history of the Chinese welfare state. More than half of the urban residents in 12 
provinces were covered by the end of 2010. Since then, the government intensified state 
funding of social health insurance, with coverage exceeding 80% in 26 out of 30 prov-
inces (Huang 2014: 930). 
In 2008, the Labor Contract Law was introduced. According to the Labor Law of 
1994, employers could refuse to sign labor contracts or choose to only sign short-term 
contracts with workers, which made migrant workers very vulnerable regarding their 
rights and benefits. The Labor Contract Law of 2008 requires enterprises to sign labor 
contracts with all employees regardless of their hukou status, and to include them in 
basic social insurance programs as part of their labor contracts. Besides, employees may 
terminate their labor contracts and request financial compensation if employers are un-
willing to pay out social benefits.  
In 2009, the New Rural Social Pension Scheme (NRPS) with voluntary participation 
was promulgated. 
In 2010, regulations on the enhancement of basic social insurance participation of 
migrant workers were introduced, which institutionally guaranteed the portability of 
pension entitlements (both individual and pooling accounts) to new workplaces when 
migrants work across provincial boundaries (Cai 2011: 41). These regulations resulted 
in an increased social insurance participation of migrant workers.9 
In 2011, the Social Insurance Law was introduced as a comprehensive national 
framework. This law constituted the first basic regulations on social security since the 
foundation of the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1949, including pension, medical, work 
                                                 
9 See Appendix IV: Developments in social insurance participation of migrant workers. 
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injury, unemployment and maternity insurance. According to the Social Insurance Law, 
all employees (including migrant workers) were to be covered by social insurance and 
the transferability of social insurance benefits were to be ensured when workers move. 
Moreover, contributions were to be split between employers and employees at different 
rates to social funds which were to be managed by local governments and pooled at the 
provincial or municipal level. 
In the same year, the State Council introduced the Urban Residents’ Social Pension 
Insurance Scheme (URPS) for un-salaried urban residents, combining a funded pension 
financed by individual premiums and government subsidies. 
In 2014, the State Council decided to merge the NRPS and the URPS into a unified, 
universal non-contributory pension scheme known as the Residents’ Social Insurance 
Pension Scheme (RPS). 
In 2015, the Basic Old-Age Pension for Civil Servants was replaced by the Urban 
Employees’ Basic Pension Insurance Scheme (UEPS). 
In less than four decades, China has transformed its economic system from a central-
ly-planned to open-market economy while maintaining its socialist corpus. The eco-
nomic restructuring in the 1980s was accompanied by transformations in China’s socio-
economic structure which had major consequences for its social security system. Under 
the centrally-planned economy, social welfare was provided via work units and collec-
tives. With market transition, China’s previous socialist welfare system began to erode, 
leaving huge parts of the population unprotected. With rising social problems, the 
communist government began to reform its old social security system in the late 1990s. 
The consolidation towards a more inclusive system started towards the end of the centu-
ry and ever since has been a continuous process. In recent years, the Chinese govern-
ment has made remarkable efforts by introducing reforms towards universal social in-
surance coverage, especially in terms of pensions and health insurance. Reforms of the 
past two decades produced a welfare system that mainly consists of social insurance and 
social assistance programs with for the most part separate schemes in urban and rural 
areas (see Table 3). 
Given these remarkable developments of China’s social security system, it is highly 
interesting to integrate China into the welfare-regime debate. The following chapter 
analyzes China’s contemporary social security system from a welfare-typological per-
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spective and aims to classify the Chinese welfare state according to the Three Worlds 
framework. 
  
Table 3: Outline of relevant social security programs in China as of 2015 
 Urban Rural 
Pension insurance Residents’ Social Insurance Pen-
sion Scheme (2014) 
Urban Employees’ Basic Pension 
Insurance Scheme (2015) 
Residents’ Social Insurance 
Pension Scheme (2014) 
Health insurance Urban Employee Basic Medical 
Insurance (1998) 
Urban Resident Basic Medical 
Insurance (2007) 
New Rural Cooperative Medi-
cal Insurance (2003) 
Unemployment insurance Unemployment Insurance (1999) N/A 
Work injury/disability insur-
ance 
Work Injury Insurance (1999) N/A 
Maternity insurance Regulations on Labor Protection 
for Female Workers (1988, revi-
sions in progress) 
N/A 
Social assistance MLSS (1993, pilot) and supple-
mentary support to low-income 
households (2005) 
MLSS (2007, national imple-
mentation) and supplementary 
support to low-income house-
holds (2003) 
N/A: not available. 
Source: Compiled by author based on Bösch (2012) and SSA (2015). 
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4. CLASSIFICATION OF THE CHINESE WELFARE STATE 
In the following, the Chinese welfare state is classified according to Esping-Andersen’s 
theoretical framework for his Three Worlds typology. This is done via a status-quo-
analysis along three analytic dimensions – decommodification, social stratification and 
the state-market-family relationship – based on data for the latest years available. In 
accordance with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) analysis, the primary focus of attention here 
is on China’s pension, health and unemployment insurance systems. Each section of this 
chapter includes an introduction and operationalization of the analytic project for each 
analytic dimension, as well as an interim conclusion in which the key findings are 
summarized and presented in a table. 
4.1. Dimension I: Decommodification 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 21) states that the concept of social citizenship10 must involve 
the granting of social rights which again is accompanied by the decommodification of 
individuals’ status vis-á-vis the market. Decommodification refers to the provision of 
welfare that does not depend on workers’ relations to the cash nexus on the labor market. 
It indicates the degree to which individuals’ social rights are detached from the same 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 47). This analytical dimension looks at the quality of social 
rights in the Chinese welfare state and analyzes the decommodification potential of pen-
sion, health and unemployment insurance programs. Determining the decommodifica-
tion potential of social policies requires the analysis of “the rules and standards that per-
tain to actual welfare programs” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47), meaning the accessibility 
of benefits and benefit generosity as operationalized in Table 4.  
Table 4: Operationalization of the decommodification potential of social policies 
Criteria Definition 
Decommodification  
potential of social policies 
Accessibility 
Coverage The scope of the circle of people 
covered under insurance 
High, if access is universal 
Eligibility rules Means- or needs-tests; previous 
employment record or work per-
formance; financial contributions; 
citizenship or residence 
High, if social rights are granted 
regardless 
                                                 
10 See Marshall (1950) for his conceptualization of social citizenship. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Criteria Definition 
Decommodification  
potential of social policies 
Benefit generosity 
Range of cash benefits Level of income replacement1 for 
cash benefits of employment-
based schemes 
Low, if benefit level falls substan-
tially below normal earnings or 
standards of living considered ade-
quate and acceptable in society 
Restrictions on entitle-
ments 
Benefit duration, waiting days for 
cash benefits, qualifying period 
for cash benefits of employment-
based schemes2 
Low, if limited benefit duration, 
long waiting days or long qualifying 
period 
1 The ratio of the net benefit payable to a typical (single worker) – someone earning the average pro-
duction worker’s wage – to their net income (Scruggs/Allan 2006: 57). 
2 For sickness and unemployment cash benefits: waiting days before one can receive the benefit; the 
number of weeks for which the benefit can be received; the number of weeks of work or insurance 
necessary to receive a benefit of the length specified in benefit duration. For pension benefits: number 
of required contribution years. 
Source: Compiled by author based on Esping-Andersen (1990). 
 
4.1.1. Social rights for the old-aged 
 
ACCESSIBILITY 
China’s contemporary pension insurance system consists of two public social insurance 
schemes. The UEPS is an employment-based social insurance scheme with mandatory 
individual accounts. It covers urban employees (including legally employed migrant 
workers), self-employed persons, part-time and irregular workers, as well as public em-
ployees and civil servants. Some urban workers may additionally join private savings 
schemes managed by private-sector insurance companies with little government in-
volvement (Ye 2011). The RPS is a residence-based social insurance scheme combining 
a non-contributory, non-means-tested social pension with individual savings accounts. It 
covers rural and unsalaried urban residents. 
Eligibility for the UEPS requires financial contributions by employers (20% of total 
payroll) and employees (8% of total wage), a contribution duration of minimum 15 
years and reaching the statutory retirement age (60 for men and white-collar women, 55 
for blue-collar women and 50 for other categories of women). The RPS’s social pension 
is disconnected from individual contributions, premiums or work records and is payable 
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at a pension age of 60 years for both men and women. Benefits of the RPS’s individual 
account additionally require the payment of individual premiums with a minimum pay-
ment duration of 15 years. 
 
BENEFIT GENEROSITY 
Persons insured under the UEPS are entitled to receive pension benefits in two parts: 
basic pension benefits and mandatory individual account funds. The benefit level for the 
basic pension depends on the average local wage in the previous year plus average indi-
vidual monthly wage used to calculate contributions (insured’s average monthly wage 
indexed to the average local wage), divided by two. The result is multiplied by 1% for 
each year of contributions. The average basic pension paid out in 2015 was 2,270 yuan 
(320 USD) per person per month (MoF 2016). Benefits of the mandatory individual 
account are based on the insured’s contributions divided by the actuarial month (139 in 
2014), with the option of a lump-sum payment of the account balance. The minimum 
pension (basic pension plus pension based on mandatory individual account) is 40% to 
60% of the average local monthly wage during the previous year, depending on the re-
gion (SSA 2015). In 2014, the net pension replacement rate for the UEPS was 45%, 
compared to 58% in 2005 and 71% in 1997 (People’s Network 2013; Accounting Net-
work 2016). 
The minimum contribution duration for UEPS benefits is 15 years (10 years for early 
pension when being assessed with total disability or 8-10 years of coverage if employed 
in arduous or unhealthy work). Participants who joined the UEPS before 2011 and who 
have contributed at least 10 but less than 15 years at the retirement age, may make 
lump-sum contributions to become eligible for the basic pension. 
4.1.2. Social rights for the sick 
 
ACCESSIBILITY 
China’s contemporary health insurance system consists of three public social insurance 
schemes. The UEBMI is an employment-based social insurance scheme with mandatory 
individual accounts. It covers urban employees in urban state-owned and private enter-
prises (including migrant workers), party and government authorities, social groups and 
non-profit organizations, with voluntary coverage for urban self-employed persons. The 
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URBMI is a residence-based social insurance scheme covering unsalaried urban resi-
dents (including children, the elderly and long-term unemployed). The NCMS is also a 
residence-based social insurance scheme covering rural residents, with voluntary cover-
age for self-employed persons in rural areas. Other types of health insurance include 
commercial health insurance for individuals and company supplementary health insur-
ance. Moreover, there exists a complementary health insurance system for civil servants 
financed by central and local governments. 
 Eligibility for UEBMI benefits requires financial contributions by employers (6-8% 
of total payroll) and employees (2 % of total wage). The length of sick leave and level 
of sickness cash benefits depend on the insured’s (continuous) work record. There are 
no further eligibility rules for medical and sickness-cash benefits. Eligibility for resi-
dence-based social health insurance schemes requires the payment of individual premi-
ums only. 
 
BENEFIT GENEROSITY 
According to the Labor Law, the UEBMI provides sickness cash-benefits to employees 
who suffer from illness or non-work related injuries. These benefits are usually paid at a 
reduced rate ranging from 60-100% of an employee’s daily wage, depending on his or 
her work record, working seniority and on local regulations, for up to 24 weeks each 
year. Thereafter, 40-60% is paid until the employee recovers or is assessed with a per-
manent disability (SSA 2015). 
There is no minimum qualifying period, nor waiting days for sickness benefits. In 
general, sickness benefits are paid from three to 24 months, depending on an employ-
ee’s work record (years of employment) and seniority with their current employer. For 
example, the minimum duration of sickness benefits is three months for employees with 
less than 10 years of continuous work record and less than five years of seniority with 
their current employer. 
4.1.3. Social rights for the unemployed 
 
ACCESSIBILITY 
China’s contemporary unemployment insurance (UI) system consists of a public-
mandatory social insurance program covering all employees of urban (state-owned and 
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private) enterprises and institutional organizations and, conditionally, urban self-
employed persons with or without employees. It excludes urban employees of pension-
able age. Migrant workers are allowed to register as unemployed and hence may partic-
ipate in the UI. Moreover, there exist re-employment policies including several forms of 
re-employment and job-seeking training and assistance, as well as the encouragement of 
self-employment. There is no national unemployment insurance for rural workers. 
Eligibility for UI benefits requires that individuals must be involuntarily unemployed, 
have contributed for at least one year, be regularly reporting to a local employment-
service agency and be actively seeking employment. Moreover, insured persons need to 
be registered as unemployed in urban areas. Claimants have to apply for unemployment 
benefits within 60 days after their labor contract expires or is terminated. Continuing 
eligibility requires that UI beneficiaries be actively seeking, capable of, and available 
for work. Refusing a suitable job offer may cease or suspend benefits. Furthermore, 
claimants become ineligible for receiving UI benefits upon gaining re-employment, 
enrollment in schools, recruitment into military service, living abroad and being entitled 
to pension insurance benefits. 
 
BENEFIT GENEROSITY 
The UI program provides benefits in terms of unemployment cash benefits, medical 
subsidies, allowances for funeral expenses and survivors’ benefits to dependent spouses 
and family members, provisions to support employment or re-employment including 
vocational training and other benefits. Cash benefits of the UI program are not earnings-
related, but flat-rate and defined by local governments. These require that benefit levels 
must be above the minimum living standard, but below the local minimum wage. Ac-
cording to national statics, the national average monthly UI benefit was 1051.4 yuan in 
2016 (MoHRSS 2017). When compared to other countries, UI benefit levels remain 
quite low and benefits provide a much lower income replacement rate, with a replace-
ment rate of only 14.7% in 2005 (Vodopivec/Tong 2008). The author Kongshøj (2015: 
77) reports an average net replacement rate of 23% in 2011. 
Unemployment benefit duration is graded according to contribution or coverage du-
ration. Benefits are paid up to 12 months with less than five years of coverage, for up to 
18 months with less than five but more than ten years of coverage, or for up to 24 
months with ten or more years of coverage. The minimum qualifying period is one year. 
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Besides, there is no waiting period before benefits are paid out for as UI benefits are 
calculated from the date of unemployment registration. Benefits are paid monthly, ex-
cept for contracted migrant workers who receive a lump-sum living allowance if they 
had over one year of continuous service and their employers have paid the UI contribu-
tion. 
4.1.4. Interim conclusion 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 48) argues that conditions for entitlements are usually linked to 
the type of social security arrangement which has its peculiar effect on decommodifica-
tion. China’s social security system is predominately based on the social insurance prin-
ciple, distinguishing between employment-based schemes targeted to urban employees 
and residence-based schemes for rural resident and unsalaried urban residents. 
The accessibility of social entitlements in China is primarily determined by the em-
ployment and hukou status of individuals (see Table 5). Social rights are mainly target-
ed to the urban workforce for as China’s social insurance system primarily extends the 
social rights of employed urban residents. Benefits of employment-based schemes are 
contributory and earnings-relate, except for UI benefits which are flat-rate but oriented 
towards the local minimum wage and minimum living standard. This means that labor 
market participation is assumed and the decommodification potential of these social 
policies remains limited. Social insurance participation for other types of employees 
(self-employed, irregular or part-time employed, migrant workers without labor con-
tracts) is mostly voluntary and limited. Sickness as well as unemployment benefits are 
only available to urban insured persons, excluding rural workers. However, health in-
surance also cover unemployed persons and sickness benefits are non-contributory. In 
contrast to employment-based schemes, residence-based schemes extend social rights to 
all citizens regardless of their employment status or work records, and in the case of 
China’s means-tested social pension, they are granted regardless of individual contribu-
tions. Although the range of residence-based social insurance schemes is limited to pen-
sion and health insurance, their decommodification potential in terms of access to social 
benefits is high. Pension benefits have a rather low replacement rate of 45% of previous 
incomes, but they are already granted with a contribution duration of 15 years and a 
retirement age of 55-60 years. Sickness benefits approximate 60-100% of an employ-
ee’s daily wage (in the first 24 weeks of sickness) and are granted without waiting days 
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or a minimum qualifying period. The duration of benefit payments, however, depends 
on the years of employment and working seniority of insured persons with their current 
employer. Depending on this, sickness benefits are paid from three to 24 months. Un-
employment benefits provide a very low income replacement with a replacement rate of 
only 23%, albeit without waiting days before one can receive benefits. Even though the 
minimum qualifying period is one year, unemployment benefits are already paid up to 
12 months, with the length of benefit payments depending on the insured’s contribution 
duration. 
Table 5: Analysis of decommodification in the Chinese welfare regime 
Scheme Target group Range of entitlements Range of cash benefits 
UEPS Urban employees 
Employment-based, contributory, work 
record; earnings-related benefits 
Low pension replace-
ment rate (45%), but 
low qualifying period 
(15 years) 
RPS 
Rural and  
unsalaried urban 
residents 
Residence-based 
Social pension: non-contributory 
Individual account: individual premium 
N/A 
UEBMI Urban employees 
Employment-based, contributory, work 
record; earnings-related benefits 
N/A 
Sickness Urban employees 
Non-contributory (employer-funded), work 
record, working seniority, no government 
subsidy 
60-100% of daily wage 
(in the first 24 weeks) 
with no waiting days or 
minimum qualifying 
period; benefit duration 
of 3 to 24 months 
URBMI 
Unsalaried urban 
residents 
Residence-based, individual premium N/A 
NCMS Rural residents Residence-based, individual premium N/A 
UI Urban employees 
Employment-based, contributory, work 
record; flat-rate benefits 
Low replacement rate 
(23%), but no waiting 
days; minimum qualify-
ing period of 1 year; 
benefit duration of 12 to 
24 months 
N/A: not applicable. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
4.2. Dimension II: Social stratification 
The second analytic dimension looks at the stratification effects of social policies in the 
Chinese welfare state. The concept of social stratification measures how key welfare 
state policies structure social relations in terms of class and social order. According to 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 58), welfare states differ in terms of their different effects on 
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social structure: “One may cultivate hierarchy and status, another dualisms, and a third 
universalism. Each case will produce its own unique fabric of social solidarity”. The 
particular stratification effects of social policies are measured using three empirical in-
dices (conservatism, liberalism, socialism) with several macro-features of welfare pro-
grams to measure these (Scruggs/Allan 2008: 646). Table 6 provides a description of 
these indicators and features, as well as the operationalization of regime-specific strati-
fication effect of social policies in China. The exact stratification potential of these indi-
ces is assessed in accordance with Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 77-78) scoring procedure 
for stratification indices (see Appendix II: Calculation of stratification indices). 
Table 6: Operationalization of the stratification effect of social policies 
Criteria Definition 
Stratification effect 
of social policies 
Conservative stratification 
Corporatism 
(relative degree of occupa-
tional status differentiation) 
Number of occupationally distinct pension 
schemes in operation 
Conservative, if high 
Etatism 
(relative privileges accorded 
to civil servants) 
Pension expenditures for civil servants as % of 
GDP 
Conservative, if high 
Liberal stratification11 
Relative importance of so-
cial assistance 
Expenditure on means-tested benefits as % of 
total public social expenditure 
Residual, if high 
Relative importance of pri-
vate health 
Private health expenditure as % of total health 
expenditure 
Residual, if high 
Social-democratic stratification12 
Degree of universalism Share of relevant population covered under 
respective program1 and thus eligible for social 
benefits 
Universal, if high 
1 Pension, health and unemployment insurance schemes. 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
Source: Compiled by author based on Esping-Andersen (1990). 
 
                                                 
11 Esping-Andersen (1990: 73) additionally considers the relative importance of private pensions (meas-
ured as private pension expenditure as share of total pension expenditure) when measuring liberal stratifi-
cation. As there is a lack of available national data on private pension spending in China, this liberal-
regime indicator is not considered further in the following. 
12 Esping-Andersen (1990: 70) additionally includes ‘benefit differentiation’ when measuring social-
democratic stratification in terms of cash benefits provided to deal with the social risks of old-age, sick-
ness and unemployment, which he defines as the ratio of what a normal standard worker will receive as a 
standard benefit to the maximum benefit stipulated in the rules of the system. As China’s social security 
system is highly fragmented, calculating ‘average’ benefit differentials for each scheme of a program 
would go beyond the scope of this master’s thesis, and thus they are left out. 
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4.2.1. Conservative stratification 
Two factors capture conservative stratification goals (status maintenance and privileged 
treatment of civil servants), namely corporatism and etatism. Corporatism refers to the 
segmentation of public pension programs along occupational lines, whereas etatism is 
the extent of pension expenditure on government employees as share of GPD (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 69-70). 
CORPORATISM 
China’s public pension program is not segmented along occupational categories. There 
exists only one employment-based public pension scheme for all urban employees (in-
cluding civil servants and public employees), namely the UEPS. Thus, China scores low 
on corporatism. 
ETATISM 
With the latest pension reform, according to which the Basic Old-Age Pension for Civil 
Servants was merged with the UEPS in 2015, the relative privilege of China’s civil 
servants and public employees was nullified. The degree of etatism in China’s pension 
system is low. 
 
4.2.2. Liberal stratification 
To capture liberal stratification goals, private spending patterns in terms of social relief 
(residualism) and health (market solution in welfare provision) are considered. The rela-
tive importance of social assistance is measured as government expenditure on means-
tested benefits as share of total public social expenditure (social-relief variable), where-
as the relative importance of private health is measured as private health spending as 
share of total health expenditure (private-health variable) (Esping-Andersen 1990: 73). 
MEANS-TESTED SOCIAL RELIEF  
China’s contemporary social security system includes several means-tested social assis-
tance programs, such as the MLSS which operates in urban and rural areas, the medical 
assistance scheme, the rural Five Guarantees system and others. In 2014, national gov-
ernment expenditure on social assistance was 208.3 billion yuan, which is 0.42% of 
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total public social expenditure.13 Most of the social assistance spending went to the rural 
and urban MLSS schemes (87.3% and 71.3%, respectively), followed by medical assis-
tance (25.3%), five guarantees (18.9%) and other social assistance programs (5.8%) 
(MCA 2015). The relative importance of means-tested social assistance in China is low. 
PRIVATE HEALTH SPENDING 
According to WHO (2014) data, private expenditure on health accounted for 44% of 
total health expenditure in China in 2014 (compared to 62% in 2004 and 56% in 1997). 
The relative importance of private-health spending in China is high. 
 
4.2.3. Social-democratic stratification 
The social-democratic stratification goal (universalism) is captured via the degree of 
universalism measured as the share of relevant population covered under pension, health 
and unemployment insurance schemes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 73). 
DEGREE OF UNIVERSALISM 
By the end of 2015, the number of people covered under the two pension schemes 
(UEPS and RPS) was 858.33 million, which is 75% of the total adult population14. 
Among them, 353.61 million people (including 262.19 million employees and 91.41 
million retirees) contributed to the UEPS, which is 87% of the total urban employed 
population. In the same year, 504.72 million people contributed to the RPS, with 148 
million beneficiaries (NBSC 2016). Among the rural residents, 463 million participated 
in the RPS, which Liu and Sun (2016: 24) estimate to be 80% of the total rural adult 
population. By the end of 2015, the number of migrant workers who participated in the 
UEPS was 55.85 million, which is 23% of the migrant population (MoHRSS 2016). 
By the end of 2013, the three health insurance programs of UEBMI, URBMI and 
NCMS had covered 1.34 billion people, equivalent to 99% of the total population 
(NBSC 2016). Among them, 570.73 million people were covered by the urban scheme 
(78% of the urban population), with 274.43 million UEBMI participants (72% of the 
urban employed population) and 296.29 URBMI participants (85% of the urban non-
                                                 
13 Total public social expenditure (defined as national government expenditure for education, healthcare 
and social security and employment aid) was 49186.8 billion yuan in 2014 accounting for 7.6% of GDP 
(see Appendix III: Evolution of China’s public social expenditure). 
14 Calculated by author as total population aged 15 years and above (1.15 billion in 2015) (NBSC 2016). 
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employed population). The NCMS covered 802 million rural residents, accounting for 
99% of the rural population (NHFPC 2014). In 2015, 51.66 million migrant workers 
participated in the UEBMI, which constitutes a coverage rate of 21% (MoHRSS 2016). 
Despite extending the coverage beyond the SOE sector in 1999, the UI currently co-
vers less than half of the urban workforce. In 2015, 173.3 million were insured under 
the UI program which is a coverage rate (share of insured workers in total urban work-
force) of 43%. Thus, the UI program only included 23% of the total workforce in 2015. 
The number of recipients of unemployment benefits was 2.27 million, which constitutes 
24% of the registered unemployed (NBSC 2016). Among the insured, 42.19 million 
migrant workers, or 17% of the total floating population, participated in unemployment 
insurance (MoHRSS 2016). Table 7 summarizes the coverage rates for China’s pension, 
health and unemployment insurance programs. 
Table 7: Coverage rates for China’s pension, health and unemployment insurance programs 
Scheme Participants Total Coverage rate1 Total 
(as % of total popu-
lation2) 
UEPS 353 million 
858 million 
87% 
75% 
RPS 505 million / 
UEBMI 274 million 
1,340 million3 
72% 
99% URBMI 296 million 85% 
NCMS 802 million 99% 
UI 173 million 173 million 43% 23% 
Note: Figures for UPES, RPS and UI are for 2015, whereas figures for health insurance schemes 
(UEBMI, URBMI and NCMS) are for 2013. 
1 The coverage rate indicates the share of the relevant population covered under a program. For the 
UEPS, UEBMI and UI), the relevant population is defined as the urban workforce, for the URBMI it is 
the urban unsalaried population (urban population minus urban workforce), and for the NCMS it is the 
total rural population; 2 For pensions, the total adult population defined as the total population aged 15 
years and above is considered. For unemployment insurance, the total workforce is considered; 3 As 
migrant workers can be enrolled in both UEBMI and NCMS, there might be overlaps in participant 
numbers between these two schemes. This figure is reported to be the number of the population cov-
ered under all three schemes, without overlaps (NHFPC 2014). 
Source: Data for the NCMS are compiled from NHFPC (2014), others are compiled from NBSC 
(2016). 
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4.2.4. Interim conclusion 
China’s pension system is not divided along occupational lines, nor is it selective re-
garding the preference of civil servants and government employees. Thus, the degree of 
occupation- and status-based stratification tendencies in the Chinese welfare state is low. 
Concerning liberal stratification, China scores low on the social-relief variable and 
high on the private-health variable. As such, the Chinese welfare state is not residual in 
terms of the preference of social relief in welfare provision, however private healthcare 
plays a non-negligible role. In this way, the Chinese welfare state shows a medium de-
gree of market-based stratification tendencies. 
With regards to social-democratic stratification, the picture is less clear. Even though 
we find a medium to high coverage rate for pension and health insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance covers less than half of the urban workforce and less than a quarter of 
the total population. Hence, the Chinese welfare states shows a medium degree of uni-
versalism (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Analysis of social stratification in the Chinese welfare regime 
Stratification ef-
fects 
Findings Implications 
Conservative 
stratification 
Pension system not occupationally 
fragmented 
Low degree of corporatism 
No pension privileges for civil servants 
and government employees 
Low degree of etatism 
Liberal 
stratification 
Low government expenditure on 
means-tested social assistance (<1% of 
total public social spending) 
Not residual in terms of social relief 
High private health spending (44% of 
total health spending) 
Residual in terms of private health 
Social-democratic 
stratification 
Medium coverage rate in pension in-
surance (75%), high in health insurance 
(99%) and low in unemployment insur-
ance (23%) 
Medium degree of universalism 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
4.3. Dimension III: State-market-family relationship 
The third analytic dimension looks at the relationship between the state, market and 
family in welfare production in the Chinese welfare state. As Esping-Andersen (1990: 
21) argues, the welfare state cannot be solely understood in terms of the rights it grants, 
but also in terms of how the state’s activities are interlocked with the role of the market 
and family in welfare provision. This state-market-family relationship plays a key role 
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in shaping both decommodification and social stratification within a welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 77). In order to determine the state-market-family relationship 
in the Chinese welfare regime, the social security arrangements discussed in Dimension 
I – pension, health and unemployment insurance – are examined with regards to both 
the administration of schemes and their financing. 
 
4.3.1. Administration 
China’s pension, health and unemployment insurance systems operate both at national 
and local government level. The central government (through different government bod-
ies and departments) sets the general guidelines to local governments’ social insurance 
programs, ensures the compliance of local regulations, and supervises benefit provision 
and non-participating enterprises. Relevant government bodies include the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MoHRSS) and the National Health and Family 
Planning Center of China (NHFPC) which is responsible for the administration of the 
NCMS. 
The Department of Pensions and Department of Rural Social Insurance under the 
MoHRSS provide general supervision of the pension system. The Department of Medi-
cal Insurance under the MoHRSS is responsible for the UEBMI and URBMI and sets 
the general guidelines to local governments’ health insurance programs, ensures the 
compliance of local regulations, and supervises benefit provision and non-participating 
enterprises. The Department of Unemployment Insurance under the MoHRSS provides 
general guidance and ensures that local regulations follow central government guide-
lines. Program administration is decentralized to the provincial or lower levels. 
Pension insurance funds and individual accounts, as well as the RPS, are adminis-
tered by provincial or local social insurance agencies, with funds being regulated by 
social security authorities.  
The UEBMI and its health insurance fund are administered by local government so-
cial insurance agencies and participating enterprises. Individual savings accounts and 
the URBMI are administered by local governments and social insurance agencies. The 
NCMS is administered by county-level public health authorities (non-government insti-
tutions) and partly operated by commercial insurance companies in 24% of counties, 
districts or cities (NHFPC 2014). After central government guidelines and local (pro-
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vincial) government implementation plans, the NCMS funds are pooled at the county 
level (n=2852 rural counties in 2012), whereas the funds of UEBMI and URBMI are 
pooled at municipal (prefecture) level (n=333 municipalities in 2012) (Meng et al. 
2015). 
The administration of the UI program is decentralized to social insurance agencies at 
the provincial or lower levels. Program funds are managed by local finance departments 
and are pooled at the municipal level in municipalities directly under the central gov-
ernment. Contributions are collected by tax authorities and local government social in-
surance agencies, which pay out unemployment benefits. 
 
4.3.2. Financing 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED SCHEMES 
Sources of finance for employment-based schemes include financial contributions 
which for the most part are shared between employers and employees at different rates, 
as well as supplementary government subsidies (see Table 9). 
 
Pension insurance: Insured persons under the URPS contribute 8% of their total wage 
into a mandatory individual account, whereas employers pay up to 20% of the total pay-
roll into pension funds. Self-employed persons pay 12% of the local average wage into 
the pension fund, and 8% of the local average wage into a mandatory individual account. 
Table 9: Financing of employment-based social insurance schemes 
 Employers Employees 
 
Government 
Pension insurance 20% 8% Central and local governments provide 
subsidies as needed 
Basic health insurance 6-8% 2% Central and local governments provide tax 
concessions and subsidies for administra-
tive costs 
Sickness benefits Total costs None None 
Unemployment insur-
ance 
2% 1% Provincial regulatory fund and local gov-
ernments provide subsidies to unemploy-
ment funds as required. 
Note: Employer contributions as share of total payroll, employee contributions as share of total wage. 
Source: SSA (2015). 
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Central and local governments may provide subsidies to pension funds and individual 
accounts as needed. 
Health insurance: Contributions to the UEBMI are paid by employers (6-8% of total 
payroll) and employees (2 % of total wage). Employee contributions are paid into a 
mandatory individual account, whereas employer contributions are paid into a social 
pooling fund (70%) and individual savings accounts (30%). Self-employed persons pay 
all contributions (10% of their total earnings) into individual accounts. Central and local 
governments provide tax concessions and subsidies for administrative costs. Central and 
local governments finance complementary health insurance system for civil servants 
and public employees (SSA 2015). 
Sickness benefits: According to central government guidelines, sickness benefits are 
paid by the employer (SSA 2015). 
Unemployment insurance: The financial responsibility for UI contributions is shared 
between employers (2% of total payroll) and employees (1% of total wage), with short-
falls to be covered via subsidies by a provincial regulatory fund and local governments. 
Local governments cover the administrative costs of UI program operations, but usually 
do not finance the UI program directly. Their subsidies are to be used only as a last re-
sort once other sources are depleted (Vodopivec/Tong 2008). 
 
RESIDENCE-BASED SCHEMES 
Sources of finance for residence-based schemes include individual premiums, govern-
ment subsidy and public financing (see Table 10). 
 
Social pension: The central government provides the total cost of the non-contributory 
social pension (at least 70 yuan a month per insured person) in central and western re-
Table 10: Financing of residence-based social insurance schemes 
 Individual Government 
Social pension None Total costs (min. 70 yuan/month) 
Pension insurance 
(individual account) 
Individual premium Local governments provide a minimum 
subsidy of 30-60 yuan/year 
Social health insurance 
(urban and rural) 
Individual premium Combined central and local government 
contribution of 360 yuan/person 
Source: SSA (2015). 
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gions, and 50% of the costs in eastern regions. Local governments may make additional 
contributions to the social pension. 
Pension insurance (individual account): Insured and self-employed persons can choose 
to contribute between 100 and 2,000 yuan per year according to 12 scales (local gov-
ernments may increase the number of scales) to the RPS’s individual accounts. Local 
governments provide an annual subsidy of 30 yuan to the RPS’s individual account of 
each insured person (at least 60 yuan for those who contribute at least 500 yuan) (SSA 
2015). 
Social health insurance: The social health insurance schemes of URBMI and NCMS are 
financed by annual individual premiums (90 yuan in average, 2014) and government 
subsidies. For both schemes, individual premium levels vary regionally. Contributions 
to the URBMI include government subsidies for contributions by unemployed or social 
assistance recipients, as well as individual premiums of annually 200-500 yuan (or 50-
100 yuan for children). Contributors to the NCMS include central and local govern-
ments, as well as rural collectives, with individual premiums of 20-50 yuan per year. 
Central and local governments’ subsidies amount to ca. 80% for the rural program and 
ca. 60% for the unsalaried urban residents’ program. They include an annual matching 
contribution (combining central and local governments) of 360 yuan per person (in 
2015), with the actual amount varying by province (SSA 2015). 
 
4.3.3. Interim conclusion 
The organization of social insurance is dominated by the central government and state 
actors at different administrative levels. The central government sets the general guide-
lines and provides general guidance and supervision through different government bod-
ies and their departments. The administration of social insurance schemes is decentral-
ized to local government social insurance agencies at provincial or lower administrative 
levels, which play a direct role in managing schemes, funds, individual accounts and 
benefit distribution. The private sector plays a marginal role in the social insurance sys-
tem, except for the administration of health insurance where the market assumes an in-
creasing role in the operation of the NCMS through commercial insurance companies 
(see Table 11). 
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Table 11: Analysis of the state-market-family relationship in the Chinese welfare regime 
Scheme Administration Financing 
UEPS Provincial or local social insurance agen-
cies and social security authorities 
Employer, employees, government 
subsidy 
RPS Provincial or local social insurance agen-
cies 
Government (and individual) 
UEBMI Local government social insurance agen-
cies and participating enterprises 
Employer, employees, government 
subsidy 
Sickness Individual state-run enterprises Employer 
URBMI Local governments and social insurance 
agencies 
Government and individual 
NCMS 
County-level public health authorities 
(non-government institutions) and partly 
commercial insurance companies 
Individual premium and government 
subsidy 
UI 
Social insurance agencies at the provincial 
or lower levels, and local finance depart-
ments 
Employer, employees, government 
subsidy 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
Regarding the financing of social insurance, the state assumes a central role in resi-
dence-based schemes and a supplementary role in employment-based schemes, while 
being residual in the provision of sickness benefits. Social insurance is mainly financed 
by employer and employee contributions, whereas the state provides subsidies as need-
ed. Sickness benefits are solely paid by employers, with no government subsidies. For 
self-employed persons, social insurance is voluntary and they need to make all the con-
tributions themselves. For those outside the urban work sector, such as rural residents 
and urban unsalaried resident, the state provides generous subsidies or, in the case of 
China’s social pension, bears the total costs. 
 
4.4. The Chinese Welfare Regime 
Considering the results of the analysis of decommodification, social stratification and 
the state-market-family relationship in contemporary China, the Chinese welfare regime 
shows the following features: 
In the Chinese welfare regime, social rights are modest as they are either linked to 
employment and extended on the basis of financial contributions and work records, or 
linked to residence but provide meager benefits. The principle mode of welfare provi-
sion is based on the social insurance principle, with an employment-based system oper-
ating in urban areas and a residence-based system for those outside the urban employ-
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ment sector, namely unsalaried urban residents and the rural population. The letter so-
cial insurance system is a novelty and grants universal access to citizens. 
Furthermore, the Chinese welfare regime is dualistic in the sense that it provides dif-
ferent social rights to different social groups, mainly differentiating between the rural 
and urban population, and within the urban population between the formal employment 
sector and all other urban residents. China’s pension system is neither fragmented along 
occupational lines, nor does it provide privileges to the civil service and employees in 
the public sector. There are market-based stratification tendencies in terms of private 
healthcare. Access in nearly universal for residence-based schemes, whereas coverage 
rates for employment-based schemes lag behind, especially regarding unemployment 
insurance. What is more, the decentralized nature of China’s welfare system makes for a 
narrow sphere of solidarity between localities, as social pooling is done at the municipal 
or county level and does not allow for risk pooling between localities. 
In employment-based schemes, the state assumes a regulative role than being a direct 
fiscal provider as evident in the predominately contribution-based social insurance sys-
tem, although it provides some subsidies. In doing so, it delegates its administrative 
responsibilities to local governments and its financial responsibilities to employers and 
individuals. In contrast, residence-based schemes are heavily subsidized, and in case of 
China’s social pension fully financed by the state, which indicates an increasing state 
commitment in welfare provision. The market plays a strong role in welfare provision 
for as social insurance is mostly employment-based. In terms of sickness benefits, peo-
ple depend on the market as they are solely financed by employers. This makes individ-
uals fairly dependent on the labor market to meet their welfare needs. Given the gaps in 
China’s social security system and the low benefits provided, familial support assumes 
an important role, especially for social groups outside the formal employment sector. 
Employment-based schemes are only available to the urban workforce, leaving rural 
workers without access to sickness and unemployment benefits. Consequently, rural 
residents remain heavily dependent on themselves or their family members in welfare 
provision. In contrast to rural China, the family’s role in the urban welfare mix can be 
described as strong, but rather ‘substitutive’. In sum, welfare provision in terms of pen-
sion, health and unemployment insurance is delivered through both the state and the 
market, whereby people outside the urban formal sector and rural residents are disad-
vantaged in relation to the former circle of people. 
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Hence, China is characterized by a medium-low degree of decommodification, a medi-
um-high degree of stratification and low benefit levels which enhance the role of the 
market and family in welfare provision, albeit with a different welfare mix in urban and 
rural areas (see Table 12). 
The welfare-typological classification of the Chinese welfare state reveals a profile 
of the Chinese welfare regime that does not present a homogenous picture. It rather 
shows specific characteristics which cannot be interpreted clearly in welfare-regime 
terms. At the first sight, we find two separate welfare regimes: an employment-based 
social insurance system for urban employees, and a residence-based system for those 
outside the urban (formal) employment sector. Before turning our attention towards the 
peculiarities that have shaped the contemporary Chinese welfare regime, China’s wel-
fare-regime profile should be compared with exiting welfare regimes – liberal, con-
servative-corporatist and social-democratic – by examining their similarities and differ-
ences. In what aspects do China and the Three Worlds resemble each other? In what 
aspects does China differ from the liberal, conservative-corporatist and social-
democratic models? What are the unique characteristics of the Chinese welfare regime? 
Finally and most importantly: how can the Chinese welfare state be classified according 
to the Three Worlds typology? These questions shall be answered in the following chap-
ter. 
Table 12: Summary of China’s key welfare-regime characteristics 
 The Chinese welfare regime 
 Employment-based schemes Residence-based schemes 
Social rights 
Linked to employment and ex-
tended on the basis of financial 
contributions and employment 
records 
Linked to residence and extended 
on the basis of individual premi-
ums or granted regardless 
Dominant mode  
of solidarity 
Employment in urban areas Residence 
Dominant locus  
of solidarity 
State and market State and family 
Decommodification  
potential of social policies 
High for the formal sector, albeit 
low benefit generosity 
High in terms of accessibility, 
albeit limited range of entitlements 
Stratification  
potential of social policies 
Stratification along employment-
status lines 
Stratification along hukou-status 
lines 
Role of: 
State 
Market 
Family 
Regulative 
Strong 
Substitutive 
Increasing 
Marginal 
Strong 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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5. ANALYSIS 
Having established the basic welfare-regime features of the Chinese welfare regime, the 
focus now shifts towards its classification according to Esping-Andersen’s Three 
Worlds framework. An essential step here is appreciating the peculiarities of the Chi-
nese welfare regime. The first section of this chapter discusses similarities and differ-
ences between China and the Three Worlds, before turning the attention towards the 
peculiarities of the Chinese welfare regime in the second section. The welfare mix un-
derlying the Chinese welfare regime is analyzed in the third section. The final section 
returns to the main question of this scholarly project and discusses how the Chinese 
welfare state can be classified with Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds framework. 
 
5.1. China and the Three Worlds 
Esping-Andersen (1990) emphasizes the importance of historical forces accompanied 
by underlying logics (residualism, conservatism and universalism) that have shaped 
welfare regimes, and characterizes them with unique welfare-regime components. In 
what follows is a comparison of the welfare-regime components of the Chinese welfare 
regime identified in the previous chapter with Esping-Andersen’s liberal, conservative-
corporatist and social-democratic welfare regimes. 
Before we compare China and the Three Worlds, let us briefly review the key com-
ponents of the Three Worlds. In the political economy of liberal welfare regimes, the 
welfare state is residual and market welfare is deliberately encouraged. Social rights are 
conditional upon labor market commodification (company-based insurance or private 
insurance) or market failure (restricted and targeted social assistance), which creates a 
dualism between the better-off who can rely on market solutions and the poor who de-
pend on the state. Insurance arrangements are voluntary, contractual and actuarial, and 
benefits depend on contributions. Conservative-corporatist regimes are characterized by 
occupationally fragmented social insurance schemes and the privileged treatment of the 
civil service and government employees. Social rights are linked to employment or 
(family) status and extended on the basis of past contributions and employment records. 
The family assumes a central role in welfare provision to its members, whereas the role 
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of the states is subsidiary. Social-democratic welfare regimes demonstrate a maximum 
commitment to decommodification and universal coverage, whereby a service is ren-
dered as a matter of right and a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the 
market. 
At first sight, China’s social security system closely resembles those of conservative-
corporatist welfare regimes: a social security system built on the Bismarckian type of 
social insurance in which social rights are linked to employment and extended on the 
basis of past contributions and employment records. What distinguishes China from the 
conservative model is that social insurance is not divided along occupational lines. The 
distinction in Chinese social insurance is not primarily between occupational groups, 
but between the urban-employed and the rest of the population including rural residents, 
unsalaried urban residents, and within the urban workforce between the formal sector 
and other types of workers (self-employed, irregular and part-time employees, migrant 
workers). Nonetheless, there is some degree of corporatism in China’s health insurance 
system in forms of supplementary company-based insurance and a supplementary (but 
not separate) scheme for civil servants and government employees.  
Another difference is the advent of new forms of social insurance in China in terms 
of residence-based schemes for those outside the urban employment sector, namely un-
salaried urban residents and the entire rural population. In that way, the Chinese welfare 
regime is more universal than conservative-corporatist regimes where social rights for 
the non-employed population are typically derived from the (male) breadwinner in the 
form of co-insurance of family members. China’s residence-based schemes provide 
social rights linked to residence and extend them on the basis of individual premium 
payments supported by generous government subsidies, and in the case of China’s non-
means-tested, non-contributory social pension, are granted regardless. This reflects so-
cial rights in terms of universal coverage and a right to social income outside wage la-
bor, which is highly decommodifying (Esping-Andersen 1990: 44). However, risk cov-
erage remains only comprehensive in urban areas. The rural population has only access 
to pension and health insurance and rural workers are excluded from sickness and un-
employment benefits. The access to residence-based schemes may be universal, but 
their benefit generosity is limited. Although the social pension is more or less organized 
around the Beveridge principle of universal flat-rate benefits, individual accounts re-
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main important for as benefits of the social pension are very low with a country average 
of only 81 yuan (12 USD) per month (Liu/Sun 2016). 
What is residual in the Chinese welfare regime is that social insurance mainly caters 
to urban employees of the formal sector, with voluntary and limited coverage for other 
types of urban workers and exclusion of rural workers. For self-employed persons, so-
cial insurance is voluntary and they need to make all the contributions themselves. 
Sickness benefits are financed by employers only. This makes individuals fairly de-
pendent on the labor market in case of unemployment and sickness during employment. 
Residual welfare in rural areas rests on the assumption that famers can provide for 
themselves, which enhances the welfare role of households. Moreover, benefits of em-
ployment-based schemes provide only low income replacement – with pension and un-
employment benefits approximating 45% and 23% of the previous earnings, respective-
ly – and are likely to drive recipients back to work (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47). 
With regards to liberal stratification goals, the Chinese welfare regime shows a me-
dium degree of market-based stratification tendencies. In China, expenditure on means-
tested social assistance is less than 1%. As such, the welfare state is not residual in the 
sense of primarily providing restricted and targeted social rights to citizens. China has a 
long poor-relief tradition dating back to the imperial period. Currently, social assistance 
consists of the unified MLSS and the rural Five Guarantees system. The MLSS requires 
means-testing and grants cash benefits conditional on family income which must be 
below the regional minimum living standard. In history, the Five Guarantees system 
catered to the poorest rural residents who had to undergo means-testing by neighbors. 
Benefits were granted only in extreme cases, and attached with heavy stigmatization of 
its recipients. Even today, MLSS applications are processed by community members 
(local street officers and residents’ committees) who monitor recipients, which leads to 
stigmatization (Ngok 2010). Notwithstanding, we cannot speak of a ‘social assistance 
model’ in the Chinese welfare regime. In the liberal regime, social assistance is the 
dominant mode of state welfare provision, whereas in China the MLSS and other pro-
grams constitute the last safety resort in a somewhat comprehensive social security sys-
tem. Although private insurance plays a marginal role in China, mostly in forms of sup-
plementary company-based insurance and commercial pension and health insurance, the 
private healthcare sector plays a non-negligible role with 44% of the total health spend-
ing devoted to private heath. As such, China remains polar in terms of market provision 
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of welfare with marginal importance of social relief and high importance of private 
health spending. 
When considering conservative stratification goals (corporatism and etatism), we 
find striking differences between China and the conservative-corporatist model. China 
scores low on both indices that capture conservatism (no segmented corporatist social 
insurance, no pension privileges for the civil and public service). China’s pension sys-
tem is not divided along occupational lines, but there rather exists one unified pension 
program for all urban employees. Since the 2015 pension reform, civil servants and 
public employees are now subject to the same pension rules as employees in enterprises 
and must make contributions. In order to show the innovative character of this reform, it 
is advisable to look at the history of civil service pensions. Etatism has a long history in 
the Chinese welfare regime. Civil servants and public employees have been enjoying 
privileged welfare treatments since the establishment of the GIS in 1953. Prior to the 
2015 pension reform, civil servants and public employees enjoyed a privileged status 
with a separate pension scheme) consisting of a non-contributory fully state-funded 
pension, with pension benefits approximating 80-90% of previous earnings (Feng/Chen 
2016). As such, China’s pension system reinforced inequalities between workers in the 
state and public sector and the rest of the urban workforce. In 2006, public expenditure 
on pensions of civil servants and government employees constituted 1.1% of GDP (Pa-
lacios/Whitehouse 2006). The introduction of the new pension reform meant the abol-
ishment of the wholly state-funded government pension and the end of dual urban old-
age pension schemes. 
If we look at social-democratic stratification indices in the Chinese welfare regime, 
the picture becomes less clear. Coverage rates for social insurance are fairly high, with 
the exception of unemployment insurance which covers only 23% of China’s total 
workforce. According to Bösch (2012), reasons for low UI coverage rates include that 
many enterprises can evade from paying-out benefits, that access to unemployment in-
surance is limited outside the formal sector and that contribution payments are misused 
by local authorities. Active labor market policies and regulated markets are characteris-
tics of the latter regime (Esping-Andersen 1990: 80), whereas in contemporary China 
unemployment insurance is underdeveloped. The official registered unemployment rate 
in urban China has increased steadily from 3.0% in 1996 to 4.1% in 2015. Across re-
gions, unemployment rates vary from 1.4% (Beijing) to 4.5 % (Heilongjiang) in 2015 
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(NBSC 2016)15. Nevertheless, there is no effort to active labor market policies in China, 
and what is more, no unemployment insurance for rural workers.  In this sense, the dif-
ference between the Chinese and social-democratic welfare regime is significant. Even 
if access to pension and health social insurance is nearly universal, programs for urban 
employees and other social groups differ in regards to benefit levels and the scope of 
social entitlements. In order to emphasize unequal benefit distribution in China’s social 
insurance system, at this point I shall illustrate the differences in benefit levels in Chi-
na’s pension: the average benefit of the social pension amounted to 81 yuan, whereas 
the country average level for UEPS benefits was 2,270 yuan per month which is 30 
times higher than the social pension (Liu/Sun 2016; MoF 2016).  
Given that China’s social security system is a predominantly employment-based so-
cial insurance system, the market and family assume a strong role for individuals out-
side the urban (formal) work sector. What distinguishes China from the conservative, 
social insurance model is the advent of new forms of social insurance, in which the state 
assumes a central role in financing schemes. But this not sufficient to replace the role of 
the family, for as the range and scope of benefits for residence-based schemes are lim-
ited. The absence of comprehensive social security arrangements in rural China rests on 
the assumption that the family is still the main welfare provider. In this sense, China’s 
approach in rural areas resembles conservative social policy. 
The logic underlying this welfare mix can then be best described as ‘conservative so-
cialism’, expressed by a considerable policy commitment to universal social insurance, 
albeit with gaps in the social security system which reinforce the role of the family out-
side the urban formal employment sector, especially for rural residents. At first sight, 
China seems to combine elements of all three regimes. It shares with the liberal welfare 
regime a strong reliance on private healthcare, with the conservative-corporatist model a 
welfare system primarily based on the social insurance principle, and with the social-
democratic model a considerable commitment to universal social insurance coverage 
(see Table 13). 
  
                                                 
15 Scholars argue that unemployment in China is difficult to measure due to its inconsistency with ILO 
definitions (Vodopivec & Tong 2008). Thus, the actual unemployment rate it thought to be much higher 
than official figures indicate, as they do not include xiagang gongren, migrant workers, and young col-
lege and high school graduates who have been out of school for six months or less (Bösch 2012). 
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At the same time, the Chinese welfare regime shows peculiarities that cannot be clearly 
interpreted. For this reason, it is important to have a closer look at these elements, be-
fore analyzing in greater depth how China’s welfare-regime characteristics function and 
combine in the welfare mix. 
5.2. Peculiarities of the Chinese welfare regime 
The following section sheds light onto the peculiarities of the Chinese welfare regime, 
that haven been identified in concluding the classification of the Chinese welfare state 
in chapter 4. These include i) the rural-urban-divide and exclusion of migrant workers, 
aggravated by China’s hukou-system (hukou-status based inequalities), ii) the division 
within the urban workforce between the formal and informal sector (employment-based 
inequalities), as well as (iii) regional disparities as a result of decentralized and frag-
mented social insurance administration. 
 
HUKOU-STATUS BASED INEQUALITIES 
The probably most distinctive feature of China’s social security system is the rural-
urban-divide which is linked to the different stages of economic development of the 
respective areas and was strengthened by the household registration system. By the late 
1970s, the Chinese welfare state catered to about four fifths of the urban population. Of 
course, the percentage of people living in the cities at that time was only 19 percent. 
This means the Chinese welfare state was only existent in the cities, and not in the coun-
tryside (Aspalter 2001). China’s dual economy is a result of a heavy industrial priority 
model designed to boost industrialization by transferring value from rural to urban areas, 
which is characteristic for state-socialist economies (London 2014). This economic du-
alism was transferred to the area of social security through China’s household registra-
tion system, with different and much leaner sets of social rights for rural residents. 
The Chinese household registration system – hukou system – was modelled after the 
Soviet style internal passport and the traditional hukou used in imperial China. Estab-
lished in 1955 and effective as of 1958, the hukou system ever since divides the popula-
tion into agricultural (rural) and non-agricultural (urban) residents. Under the centrally-
planned economy, the rural hukou entitled its holder to access to land (the right to use 
construction land, farmland and contracted forestland), whereas the urban one granted 
HOW TO CLASSIFY THE CHINESE WELFARE STATE                                                           Page | 56  
its holder a variety of social entitlements (including pensions, healthcare, education and 
other public services). Since then, the hukou has determined different privileges in terms 
of access to good jobs, education for children, housing, healthcare and the right to move 
to cities according to one’s hukou status (Melander/Pelikanova 2013). As social security 
programs in China were primarily tailored for urban-hukou holders, farmers and other 
rural residents were excluded from the urban welfare system. The purpose of initiating 
the hukou system was twofold. Firstly, it served as employment control by preventing 
the rural workforce from moving out from agriculture and consequently maintaining an 
exclusive employment system in urban sectors. Secondly, the central government want-
ed to tie welfare entitlements to one’s hukou status in order to separate exclusive urban 
employee entitlements from rural migrants’ entitlements (Cai 2011). This approach was 
based on the assumption that rural residents could provide for themselves through farm-
ing and that land ownership would serve as an ultimate safety net (Cook 2002). Conse-
quently, China’s pre-reform social security system was characterized by a sharp urban-
rural divide and marginal welfare provision in rural areas. 
For a long time, the hukou system has been responsible for different sets of social 
rights for urban and rural residents. The range of social entitlements is greater for urban 
(employed) residents. This can be exemplified by the absence of an unemployment in-
surance system in rural China. This is due to the perception of unemployment as ‘hid-
den’ or ‘surplus labor’, which is still not subject to national policy objectives (Kongshøj 
2015). As a result, there is no official registration of unemployment in rural areas. This 
also applies to the remaining fields of social insurance. 
As most migrant workers lack an urban hukou, are employed outside the formal or 
public sector, lack labor contracts, have less stable work and low wages, they are vastly 
excluded from urban employment-based schemes. Moreover, both employers and mi-
grant workers are discouraged to participate in social insurance programs due to high 
contribution rates, the high mobility of migrant workers and the low transferability of 
social insurance accounts (Cai 2011). 
 
EMPLOYMENT-STATUS BASED INEQUALITIES 
Apart from one’s hukou status or locality, China’s welfare system is aligned to the ex-
istence of an employment contract which comes with disadvantages for the atypically 
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and informally employed. This leads to a division of the Chinese urban workforce be-
tween the formal sector and all other types of employees including self-employed, ir-
regular and part-time employed persons who receive little or no social benefits. 
 
REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
China’s social security system is characterized by a highly fragmented administration, 
which makes it hard to speak of a uniform national system. This is largely due to Chi-
na’s decentralized economy that emerged in the wake of market transition. Decentrali-
zation in China took the form of fiscal federalism where local governments resembled 
actual government in their own right (London 2014). As already mentioned, the central 
government assumes a regulative role in the administration and financing of social in-
surance by delegating these responsibilities to local governments and enterprises. This 
gives local governments at municipal or even county level autonomy in the design and 
implementation of central government guidelines. Social policy devolution hinders a 
comprehensive implementation of central government guidelines, and promotes im-
proper or corrupt use of social funds. This translates into a large number of local funds 
and low risk pooling between localities – and between richer and poorer areas – which 
undermines the funding of China’s social insurance system. 
The size of social insurance pools depend on local incomes which results into huge 
regional disparities (Meng et al. 2015). For example, the benefit level of the social pen-
sion is set at 70 yuan per month. As local governments may add up to this amount ac-
cording to their financial condition or cost of living, benefit levels vary greatly by re-
gion: the social pension in Shanghai was 540 yuan (88 USD) per month, whereas in 
Kunming it amounted to only 84 yuan (14 USD) (Liu/Sun 2016: 22). Another example 
of the high level of policy discretion of local governments is the determination of UI 
benefit levels according to the minimum living standard and minimum wage, which are 
both locally defined. As local governments may add up to this level according to their 
fiscal capacities, naturally, UI benefits will vary by region. The fragmentation of the 
social security system is also disadvantageous for migrant workers for as labor mobility 
and the transferability of social entitlements between regions remains problematic. 
The stratification outcomes in the Chinese welfare regime exhibit a dual and over-
lapping character. The next section looks at the historical, political and economic logics 
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behind these stratification effects in the overall welfare mix – state-market-family rela-
tionship in welfare allocation – of the Chinese welfare regime. 
 
5.3. The welfare mix in the Chinese welfare regime 
This section explicates the historical determinants and stratification effects of the Chi-
nese welfare regime over time. It examines in greater depth the roles of the state, market 
and family in its welfare mix, focusing on both features of established welfare regimes 
(liberal, conservative-corporatist and social-democratic) and Chinese peculiarities in the 
course of welfare-state development. 
 
ROLE OF THE STATE 
Until the late 1970s, welfare provision in China was an example of the corporatist wel-
fare state. The urban work unit – danwei – was the basic building-block of the centrally-
planned economy and was responsible for welfare provision to SOE employees via an 
enterprise-based social insurance system (LIS) (White 1998), which covered 94% of the 
urban workforce in 1978 (Zhang 2005). The danwei-based welfare system has a strong 
similarity with the former socialist ‘ghetto’ model in Europe in that it not only provided 
social benefits, but also a wide range of welfare and communal services. The underlying 
motif is also similar: the cultivation of loyalties, solidarities and harmonious integration 
(Esping-Andersen 1997: 185). In this sense, China’s ‘iron rice bowl’ resembled 'the 
cradle to the grave welfare system' in Sweden (Aspalter 2001). Despite providing a 
comprehensive range of welfare packages, China’s pre-reform system exclusively oper-
ated in urban areas and covered only 18% of the total population in 1977. Within the 
urban population, it catered to an already privileged clientele of SOE employees. As 
such, from a national perspective the pre-reform system could not be regarded as a 
comprehensive welfare state (White 1998). As White (1998: 178) states, for authoritari-
an regimes welfare functioned as tool to reinforce authority by winning the support of 
these groups or at least securing social order. In that sense, China’s pre-reform system 
resembled Esping-Andersen’s conservative-corporatist welfare regime. Although wel-
fare provision was guaranteed and overseen by the central government, the actual man-
agement and financing of social insurance was handled by the danwei’s, restricting the 
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state’s role to the regulation of welfare (Wilding 2008). The welfare state was residual 
in that its role was largely confined to limited social relief for a targeted group of people 
outside the danwei system. People outside the urban sector, notably the rural population, 
had to see their own welfare needs either through the family or the community. In rural 
areas, welfare was provided through the rural collectives. Public welfare provision was 
marginal, mainly including limited material relief to the poorest households (Five Guar-
antees). Consequently, China’ pre-reform welfare system was characterized by a sharp 
sectoral divide: the urban system was an example of the corporatist welfare state, 
whereas the rural system resembled the residual approach of liberal welfare regimes. 
The introduction of economic reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s marked a so-
cial turn. In what followed was a neo-liberal and developmental phase of social security 
development in China. As the danwei-based welfare system was seen as an obstacle to 
promoting economic growth, the central government initiated the privatization of SOEs 
under the slogan ‘small government and big society’ (Leung 2005). Consequently, sub-
stantial reforms to the socialist welfare system have ever since been initiated. The sec-
toral divide that characterized the pre-reform system sharpened with introduction of the 
household responsibility system in rural areas in the early 1980s. Welfare expansion to 
accommodate the welfare demand caused by economic transition was firstly targeted to 
urban areas. This is a feature of state-led development in China whereby public 
measures and resources have been mobilized primarily for economic purposes, especial-
ly for those who would carry the economic transition, foremost SOE employees 
(Lee/Ku 2007). With declining capacity of rural collectives to provide welfare benefits, 
collective welfare collapsed, putting a heavy welfare burden onto individuals and 
households in rural China. In contrast, the danwei-based welfare system was much 
slower to erode. These changes marked a shift away from the communist notions of 
class solidarity and decommodification towards a neo-liberal, productivity-oriented wel-
fare regime which reinforced individuals’ and families’ welfare responsibilities (White 
1998; Choi 2012). With ongoing market transition, China’s previous socialist welfare 
system began to erode, leaving huge parts of the population unprotected. This was ac-
companied by the emergence of new labor market phenomena, such as unemployment, 
informal employment and migrant workers, which were disregarded in the urban social 
security system. 
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Liberal reforms brought an end to China’s full employment policy, and the traditional 
socialist social policies – danwei-based and collective welfare – were transformed into 
more market-friendly policies (Choi 2012). With the introduction of employment-based 
social insurance schemes in urban areas, welfare responsibilities shifted from enterpris-
es to employers, employees and the state. The state remained a welfare regulator, rather 
than being involved in the financing of social welfare. What is more, the administration 
and provision of social benefits was decentralized from enterprises to regions. Formerly, 
the LIS fund was pooled at the national level, whereas now social pooling was to be 
done at local government level. Although the new system social insurance included so-
cial pooling, it only remained redistributive in the group it covered (urban formal work-
ers) and within the locality it operated in (no risk pooling between localities), and was 
thus socially regressive. 
By the end of the 1990s, the social consequences of market transition were no longer 
negligible. After the state recognized that a socialist market economy cannot function 
with some of social security, effort towards building a more inclusive welfare state in-
tensified. A first phase of serious social reform took place by the end of the 1990s for 
selective, traditionally privileged groups of public sector and urban formal sector em-
ployees, including health insurance, pensions and social assistance. In sum, this neo-
liberal and developmental phase was characterized by social policy neglect, especially 
in rural areas. The consolidation towards a more inclusive system started towards the 
end of the century and ever since has been a continuous process. 
The year 2003 marked the turning point in Chinese social policy making. After the 
SARS crisis, a rural health insurance system was introduced with substantial govern-
ment funding, now covering nearly the entire rural population. Under the slogans of 
‘building a harmonious society’ and ‘putting people first’ of the Hu-Wen administration 
(Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao) from 2002-2013, and under the current Xi-Li government 
(Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang), social security was brought to the fore of the political 
agenda. Social policy innovations included the introduction of social programs beyond 
employment-based social insurance in urban areas, extending coverage i) from urban to 
rural areas, ii) from formal to the informal sector, iii) from the state-sector to non-state 
sector, and iii) from within the labor market to outside, integrating urban and rural so-
cial security systems and ensuring more social security for the most vulnerable groups. 
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In 2007, the MLSS was extended to rural areas which marks a shift from the state’s pre-
viously residual approach in rural areas to more state commitment in welfare financing 
and provision. In 2011, the first national legislation on social insurance was introduced 
which requires that coverage was to be extended to migrant workers, that contribution 
were to be split between employers and employees at different rates (except for sickness 
benefits) and pooled into local funds and enhanced the portability of social entitlements 
when changing work places or locations. Along with other regulations, this resulting in 
an increased social insurance participation of migrant workers (see Appendix III). The 
coverage of existing social insurance schemes was further expanded. For example, Chi-
na’s social health insurance system covers 99% of the total population and hence has 
achieved universal coverage (compared to less than 30% in 2003). In recent years, the 
Chinese government has introduced new form of residence-based social insurance. 
The Chinese welfare state is increasingly engaged in efforts to integrate the urban 
and rural social security systems, which is a trend away from hukou-determined stratifi-
cation and separate welfare systems in urban and rural areas. These include the intro-
duction of pension insurance schemes for rural and urban unsalaried pension and the 
merging of these schemes into a unified, residence-based pension insurance system; as 
well as replacing the civil service person with a unified urban employees’ pension in-
surance system. The institutional design of social insurance has been moving away from 
the conservative-corporatist model, towards a more inclusive system. 
 
ROLE OF THE MARKET 
As the communist one-party system remained basically intact in China, the private wel-
fare market has been rather marginal in the Chinese welfare regime and thus very slow 
to emerge (White 1998). Prior to economic reforms, the market-based welfare existed in 
the form of corporative welfare via work units, with only limited and targeted public 
welfare provision to the demonstrably needy. Even today, employment-based welfare 
assumes an urban employment status. This divides the workforce into urban and rural, 
and within the urban into market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
In the neoliberal reform era (after the launching of economic reform), there was an 
extensive market orientation in healthcare along with the transformation of the econom-
ic system. Whereas in the pre-reform era, free healthcare was provided under the iron 
rice bowl system through work units and collectives, with market transition this system 
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of healthcare provision became inefficient. Since 1990, health insurance has entered a 
phase of rapid development and de-commercialization with the initiation of social in-
surance in the 1990s. Prior to 2000, rural residents were not covered by a formal social 
security system. This was crucial especially after the collapse of collective welfare in 
rural areas. An expansion of health insurance was initiated only in the 2000s (especially 
after the SARS crisis in 2002/03). 
Today, there is supplementary company-based insurance in pension and health, and 
private health spending if fairly high – about 44% of health spending is private. This 
indicates that the private-market based health sector is becoming strong in China. 
 
ROLE OF THE FAMILY 
Finally, we return to the family’s role in the welfare mix – a core element of conserva-
tive-corporatist welfare regimes. Before examining, it is revealing to look at China’s 
history. The institution of family care (jiating baozhang) is deeply rooted in the Chinese 
tradition and culture and has been the main pillar of old-age protection for centuries 
(Stepan/Lu 2016). In imperial China, the family assumed a central role both in society 
and in welfare production as other forms of social welfare did not exist or played a mi-
nor role. Welfare, such as care for elderly family members, was provided mutually by 
kinship and rested on the Confucian value of filial piety (Bösch 2012). Family bounda-
ries were extendable to include colleagues, friends and neighbors into a network of mu-
tual welfare. The centrality of the family in the imperial period was strengthened by the 
agriculture-based society: the majority of Chinese people subsisted on family farming 
which required mutual help and assistance of all family members, and impeded individ-
uals’ mobility and independency. The state did not interfere into family matters but ra-
ther established the macro-economic framework for family self-servicing. Recurrent 
natural disasters and famines prompted some state-welfare activities so as to prevent 
social unrest and maintain authority. Welfare benefits – if existent – were only granted 
to those who could not rely on family support, which is still an important eligibility cri-
terion for Chinese public welfare entitlements (i.e. social assistance benefits) today 
(Wong 1998).  
In the first decades of the 20th century, the early phase of industrialization was ac-
companied by urbanization and the emergence of an industrial workforce. Still, there 
was no significant welfare state commitment. According to Bösch (2012: 15), this was 
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due to the lack of state influence and financial resources as a result of the long-lasting 
war turmoil. At the same time, the family-welfare system was weakened: firstly, strong 
kinship ties were regarded a hindrance to the formation of a unified nation, and second-
ly, the slowly emerging industrialization increased the labor demand outside family 
farming. Lastly, families were torn apart due to the long-lasting wars which undermined 
families’ capacity to care for their members. 
In contemporary China, children are legally obliged to provide old-age support in 
terms of income to their parents (Wu 2013). In the pre-reform system, old-age protec-
tion in rural areas relied on a farmland- and family-based elderly support model. Pen-
sion insurance was established much later in rural than in urban areas, for as old-age 
protection in rural areas was seen as an individual responsibility and was provided for 
through a system of family and communal support (Zhu 2012; Stepan/Lu 2016). This 
system of family and communal support for elderly rural residents was also enhanced 
after the economic reform. The ‘Decision on some major issues concerning improving 
the rural social security system’ of the third plenary session of the 16th CP Central 
Committee in October 2003 included the principle that ‘old-age provision in rural areas 
should rely on family support, community service, and state assistance’ (Stepan/Lu 
2016: 123). 
In recent years, the central government has shown political commitment to universal 
pension coverage against the legacy of one-sided protection of the urban workforce and 
the dominance of family self-servicing in old-age protection in rural areas (Stepan/Lu 
2016). However, as Liu and Sun (2012: 22) argue, the access to social pension in rural 
areas is linked to a ‘policy bundle’ in which local governments oblige adult children’s 
participation in order to let their parents receive the pension. This is a local practice in 
the regions with the lowest level of administrative structure (counties, townships, vil-
lages) where the participation rate is comparatively low, and aims to encourage or en-
force the participation of middle-aged rural residents. Considering the comparatively 
low benefit generosity and restricted accessibility of the social pension in rural areas, 
this commitment only reflects the definition of a minimal state responsibility towards 
citizens, leaving the major task of old-age protection to the individual (Liu/Sun 2016: 
25). 
Even in urban areas, the family assumes a strong role in welfare provision as em-
ployment-based social insurance is tied to one’s (formal) employment status and dis-
HOW TO CLASSIFY THE CHINESE WELFARE STATE                                                           Page | 64  
criminates against atypically and informally employed (including migrant workers). 
Due to the lack of an urban-hukou status, migrant workers are particularly disadvan-
taged as they are excluded from the MLSS scheme. For these social groups the family 
consequently assumes an important substitute for public welfare provision. In this sense, 
it is justified to speak of ‘conservative’ socialism in China. However, the family’s role 
in old-age protection will be increasingly challenged by China’s family-planning policy 
and the rapid ageing of it society. The number of people aged 65 and above reached 
10.5% of the total population, with a life expectancy at birth of 76 years (74 for males 
and 79 for females) (NBSC 2016), which makes China an ‘ageing society’ (Liu/Sun 
2016: 14). 
Summarizing the welfare mix in the Chinese welfare regime, we find that inequali-
ties of the previous social security systems were reproduced over several developmental 
periods: i) a rural-urban-divide as a legacy of the hukou-system and China’s dual econ-
omy, (i) a sectoral divide between the core urban workforce and those outside as a lega-
cy of conservative-corporatist social policy, as well as (iii) a regional divide between 
richer and poorer regions and localities as a result of social policy devolution in the 
course of market transition. At the same time, China’s welfare system has become more 
inclusive, more providing and less unequal. However, given the shortcomings of the 
Chinese welfare state, the family still plays an important role, while the role of the mar-
ket seems to be lessening with the introduction of social insurance arrangements beyond 
urban employment. 
 
5.4. How to classify the Chinese welfare state? 
Great changes have been taking place in the Chinese welfare state since 2003. China has 
expanded its social security arrangements, which in the past only existed in urban areas 
and now reach out to rural residents and vulnerable groups. At the same time, the cen-
tral government has increased public social spending (see Appendix III). Social rights 
have become less linked to the employment status and more attention has been given to 
the ‘unproductive’ population. Overall, the state significantly increased its role in wel-
fare provision. This brings us back to the original question. How do we classify the 
Chinese welfare state according to the Three Worlds framework?  
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At the first sight, it seems that the Chinese welfare state has – depending on the devel-
opment period – developed from a conservative-corporatist over a neo-liberal to a more 
universal welfare regime. In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) terms, the contemporary Chi-
nese welfare state is most likely a hybrid of all three regimes: liberal in the sphere of 
healthcare, conservative-corporatist in the sphere of social insurance and social-
democratic in the sphere of universal coverage – but less residual than the first, less cor-
poratist and etatist than the second, as well as less universal and generous than the third. 
At the same time, the Chinese welfare state exhibits peculiarities that spring from par-
ticular historico-political determinants and have been shaping social security develop-
ment in China since the Maoist era. 
The welfare-typological analysis of the Chinese welfare state shows a sharp, but 
lessening divide between the rural and urban population. To some extent, we can speak 
of two welfare-regimes in China: a developed, employment-based social insurance sys-
tem which provides more but exclusive benefits to urban employees, and a developing 
residence-based system that provides more inclusive, but less generous benefits to all 
other groups. The former system resembles Esping-Andersen’s conservative-corporatist 
regime, whereas the latter shows tendencies towards the social-democratic model. How-
ever, a consolidation towards a more uniform social security system is the focus of the 
current policy agenda. The introduction of the non-means-tested, non-contributory so-
cial pension was an example for increasing universalism in the Chinese welfare regime, 
as well as the merging of the urban pension schemes is an example of flattening stratifi-
cation.  
Despite recent efforts toward a more universal social security system, the Chinese 
welfare state shows a wide array of deficiencies: Firstly, although access to social insur-
ance is moving towards being universal, it remains ‘incomplete’ (Liu/Sun 2016). There 
is still a large share of the population that is not covered by social insurance, especially 
migrant workers whose social rights are linked to their hukou-status. Recent reforms 
towards the portability of social entitlements resulted in an increasing social insurance 
participation of migrant workers (see Appendix IV: Developments in social insurance 
participation of migrant workers). However, when compared to urban-resident workers 
participation rates remain low: in 2015, only 23% of the migrant population participated 
in pension insurance, whereas the coverage rate for urban-resident workers was 87% 
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(MoHRSS 2016). What is more, due to the hukou-based nature of the MLSS system, 
migrant workers are excluded from social assistance. 
Secondly, benefit levels are low and do not provide an adequate substitute in case of 
social risks. Besides, there remain significant differences in benefits levels between so-
cial groups (including between rural and urban residents, and between the urban formal 
and informal employment sectors). As such, recent reforms to unify the welfare system 
present only a case of ‘flattened’ stratification (Liu/Sun 2016). 
Lastly, social policy devolution has given autonomy to local governments to interpret 
and implement central government guidelines, which affects the access to social insur-
ance for vulnerable groups and limits the scope and level of benefits, which leads to 
regional disparities. This results in a highly fragmented welfare system with unequal 
provision of benefits across schemes, social groups and regions. The central government 
is meanwhile well aware of these problems, as evident in recent policy initiatives. How-
ever, it remains to be seen how they will be handled. 
Overall, a distinct type of political economy has developed in China since its market 
transition and, along with it, a specific kind of welfare regime. However, this is not 
enough to conclude that China’s welfare regime is unique. There is one basic reason 
why we should hesitate to draw a final conclusion: the Chinese welfare state is still in 
process of evolution and is developing rapidly. It is far from arriving at the point of 
crystallization. In contrast to other (East Asian) nations, China’s social security system 
has undergone an incredible transformation, with a peculiar welfare mix at different 
historico-political stages. What has remained in the course of rapid transformation is the 
legacy of peculiar stratification effects, although no longer along hukou-based, but more 
along employment-based and regional lines. The ultimate direction of welfare-state de-
velopment in China is to be seen in future. With reference to Gordon White’s (1998) 
findings, it is to be expected that whatever type of welfare regime is going to emerge in 
China, it will exhibit Chinese idiosyncrasies.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is one of the most 
cited works in the field of comparative welfare research, offering both a fruitful and 
enriching framework. The main advantage of the threefold typology is that it provides 
empirical validation, analyzing programmatic features of the welfare state for a number 
of ideal typical welfare-state regimes (Castles 2001). Most other works have either been 
focusing on program characteristics without consulting systematic empirical or spend-
ing data, which alone do not allow for an institutional classification (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Scruggs/Allan 2006). Scholars argued that if alternative criteria were considered 
there might be additional regimes, such as in capitalist nations of East Asia (notably 
Jones 1990; Holliday 2000; Aspalter 2001). But, as Esping-Andersen (1997: 197) main-
tains, “the point of generalization is economy of explanation”. If we extended the three-
fold typology, we would sacrifice its merits and return to case studies instead (Esping-
Andersen 1999: 88). It is in this respect that the utilization of the Three Worlds frame-
work remains fruitful. 
In this thesis, I addressed a highly neglected case in the debate on welfare regimes, 
namely China. Analyzing the Chinese welfare state towards its decommodification, so-
cial stratification and the state-market-family relationship offered a useful interpretative 
framework for identifying both welfare-regime traits and the peculiarities underlying the 
welfare mix of the Chinese welfare regime. As mentioned earlier, the objective was not 
to incorporate China into the Three Worlds typology, but rather to engage China into 
the broader welfare-regime debate. In doing so, this master’s thesis aimed to make an 
important contribution to comparative welfare-state research. 
The welfare-regime literature on China presents a research desideratum. With the 
new official Chinese goal of building a more universal welfare system, the analysis of 
the Chinese welfare state has gained relevance in recent years. Against this background, 
the Chinese welfare state was classified with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) theoretical 
framework for his Three Worlds typology. By means of this classification, a welfare-
regime profile of China was created and in a further step compared to the liberal, con-
servative-corporatist and social-democratic regimes in a systematic form. The welfare-
typological analysis of the Chinese welfare state identified both common welfare-
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regime traits of Chinese social policy making, as well as uniquely Chinese characteris-
tics. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
This thesis was authored in relatively few pages. This is due to the author’s personal 
trade-off between including more analytic dimensions (i.e. ‘de-familialization’ or ’fa-
milialism’) or further social policies (i.e. social assistance, family policies and social 
services) and reducing the complexity of the overall topic underlying this thesis. The 
former would go beyond the scope of a master’s thesis. And given that this scholarly 
project comprises a thorough research and comprehensive analysis of the Chinese wel-
fare state in a precise and efficient manner, the latter choice appears reasonable and jus-
tified. 
Although this research was carefully prepared, there were some unavoidable limita-
tions. First of all, there was a lack of available and/or reliable data. As such, it was diffi-
cult to assess the number of persons covered under social insurance for each scheme in 
order to calculate coverage rates for different social groups. This also applied to benefit 
levels and replacement rates of cash-benefits for income-maintenance programs. This 
may be partly due to the limited accessibility of Chinese national data, but in part also 
due to the lack of official documents available in English. It must be acknowledged that 
the author is not fluent in Mandarin and thus is limited in being able to read and inter-
pret Chinese language research on the topic. Secondly, as social policy is highly decen-
tralized in China, national data tend to hide regional variations, which again makes it 
difficult to draw general conclusions on the Chinese welfare state. Hence, these results 
need to be interpreted carefully. Finally, as some of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) indices 
were modified and operationalized by the author herself, it is unavoidable that a certain 
degree of subjectivity can be found in this thesis. 
 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
In the last forty years, China has been undergoing a major economic and social devel-
opment. Reforms of the Chinese social security system have been part of this socio-
economic transition. The Chinese welfare regime of the pre-reform era was strongly 
influenced by the socialist institutions of the work unit and rural collectives. It was 
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characterized by distinct state, collective and enterprise welfare provision. Since eco-
nomic reforms towards a socialist market economy were launched in 1978, major 
changes to the former socialist security system guided by neo-liberal and developmental 
regime logics have been taking place. In recent years, the Chinese welfare state has un-
dergone a remarkable development towards a more uniform and inclusive system. This 
includes the following changes: a new cooperative health insurance system was estab-
lished which covers the entire rural population; a new form of social health insurance 
for unsalaried urban residents was created; the coverage of the MLSS was extended to 
the rural population; a uniform and non-contributory social pension was introduced; the 
urban pension system was unified by replacing the pension scheme for civil servants 
and government employees with a urban-employees’ pension scheme; and the overall 
coverage of urban social insurance was extended. The contemporary Chinese welfare 
state is most likely a hybrid of the Three Worlds: liberal in the sphere of healthcare, 
conservative-corporatist in the sphere of social insurance and social-democratic in the 
sphere of universal population coverage – albeit with Chinese deficiencies. 
 
CHALLENGES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The contemporary Chinese welfare regime has developed towards a more universal so-
cial security system with efforts to integrate the urban and rural welfare regimes into 
one unified system and efforts to include disadvantages social groups into the welfare 
system. Despite these expansion, there are significant shortcomings of China’s welfare 
system. Although the stratification effects of China’s hukou system have been lessened 
through social policy expansion to rural areas and increasing efforts to include migrant 
workers into the urban welfare system, the rural-urban-divide continues to play an im-
portant role, especially in policies regarding unemployment and sickness benefits. Most 
types of social insurance are restricted to urban areas and are not transferable across 
localities. Moreover, urban social insurance is linked to (formal) employment and dis-
criminates against the informally employed. And what is access to, is inadequate, as 
benefit levels are low and far away from securing an adequate livelihood in case of so-
cial risks. And finally, social policy devolution undermines the sustainability of the 
China’s social insurance system, both in terms of fragmented funding and low risk pool-
ing, leading to regional disparities. 
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In order to qualify as a universal welfare state in ideal-typical terms, China has to inte-
grate its urban and rural welfare regimes into a unified national system, beginning with 
the development of the rural social security system and facilitating the transportability 
of social entitlements (especially for migrant workers), while at the same time strength-
ening the supervision of compliance with central government guidelines; further extend 
population coverage and make access easy for vulnerable groups with financial support; 
adjust benefit levels to standard earnings and increase benefits levels for the social pen-
sion; re-centralization social pooling to national or higher administrative levels to allow 
for risk pooling between wealthier and poorer regions and localities; and expand its un-
employment insurance system by extending coverage beyond the urban formal sector 
and introduce active labor market policies 
In view of these problems and China’s new policy agenda, an increasing state inter-
vention in both the financing and provision of welfare benefits is to be expected. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Chinese welfare state has been undergoing a rapid development – which is a truly 
unique feature. Since only social policy reforms until 2015 were included into analysis, 
innovations to China’s welfare system introduced thereafter could not be taken into ac-
count. All the more it appears important to conduct further and continuous research. The 
focus of this thesis primarily rested on China’s pension, health and unemployment in-
surance systems. Future studies on the Chinese welfare regime should include further 
social policies into their analysis, such as the MLSS, healthcare, education and housing. 
Another interesting social policy aspect is the role of social (care) services and family 
policies in China, especially with regards to their potential to disburden households 
from their welfare responsibilities and to decommodify women (Esping-Andersen 1999). 
The Chinese welfare regime is highly dynamic and idiosyncratic, characterized by 
socialist, capitalist and conservative social policy. The transition of China’s social secu-
rity system is still in progress, with promising developments in the present system in 
recent years. Prospects of the Chinese welfare system remain an issue of great interest. 
The findings of this thesis offer a fertile ground for further comparative welfare state 
studies. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I: Calculation of decommodification indices 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 54) calculates decommodification indices for pension, sickness 
and unemployment cash-benefit programs using four indicators. He measure the de-
commodification in pensions by using 1) net replacement rate of minimum pension 
benefits average worker earnings; 2) net replacement rate of standard pension to average 
worker earnings; 3) contribution (or employment) period needed to qualify for a stand-
ard pension, measured as number of years of contribution (scored inversely); 4) individ-
ual’s share of pension financing. Based on the values on these indicators for the 18 
country cases, for each dimension there was given a score of 1 for low decommodifica-
tion, 2 for medium decommodification and 3 for high decommodification. The classifi-
cation into the three scores was done based on one standard error below and above the 
mean. Finally, the scores were weighted by percentage of the (relevant) population cov-
ered under the relevant program. Net replacement rates were multiplied by a factor of 2. 
Decommodification for sickness and unemployment cash benefits was measured in 
terms of 1) net benefit replacement rates for a standard worker during the first 26 weeks 
of illness/unemployment; 2) number of weeks of employment required prior to qualifi-
cation; 3) number of waiting days before benefits are paid; 4) number of weeks in which 
a benefit can be maintained. As with pensions, there were given scores of 1, 2 or 3 
based on the standard deviation to develop a summary decommodification index. This 
was then weighed by the (relevant) population covered as percentage of the labor force. 
Here too, net replacement rates were multiplied by a factor of 2.16 
 
  
                                                 
16 For a rank-order of welfare states in terms of combined decommodification, see Esping-Andersen 1990, 
Table 2.2 on page 52.  
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Appendix II: Calculation of stratification indices 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 77-78) develops stratification indices based on the distributions 
of countries around the mean and standard deviation on individual variables, which in-
clude welfare-regime attributes. Conservative-regime attributes include the variables 
‘corporatism’ (number of occupationally distinct pension schemes in operation) and 
‘etatism’ (degree to which civil servants are granted special welfare privileges measured 
as pension expenditure for civil servants as share of GDP); liberal-regime attributes in-
clude a social-relief (expenditure on means-tested social assistance as share of total pub-
lic social spending), private pension (private-pension expenditure to total pension ex-
penditure) and private health (private health expenditure to total health expenditure) 
variable, and social-democratic regime attributes includes the degree of universalism 
(percentage of relevant population – labor force between ages 16 and 65 – covered un-
der respective programs) and low benefit differentiation (what a normal standard worker 
will receive as a standard benefit to the maximum benefit stipulated in the rules of the 
system). 
For the corporatism variable, a score of 0 was given to countries with less than (or 
equal to) two separate occupationally distinct pension programs, a score of 2 was given 
to countries between two and five (inclusive), and a score of 4 was given to countries 
with more than five occupationally distinct programs. For the etatism variable, a score 
of 0 was given where the share is less than (or equal to) 1 percent; a score of 2 was giv-
en where the share was between 1 and 2.1 percent, and a score of 4 was given where the 
share was above 2.2 percent. 
For the social-relief variable, a score of 0 was given for an expenditure ratio of less 
than 3 percent, a score of 2 was given for a ratio from 3 and 8 percent, and a score of 4 
was given for a ratio of more than 8 percent. For the private-pension variable, a score of 
0 was given for an expenditure ratio of less than 10 percent, a score of 2 was given for a 
ratio from 10 to 15 percent, and a score of 4 was given for a ratio of more than 16 per-
cent. For the private-health variable, a score of 0 was given for an expenditure ratio of 
less than 10 percent, a score of 2 was given for a ratio from 10 to 20 percent, and a score 
of 4 was given for a ratio of more than 21 percent. 
To determine the degree of universalism, a score of 0 was given for less than (or 
equal to) 60 percent of population coverage (low degree of universalism), a score of 2 
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was given for a coverage between 61 and 85 percent (medium degree of universalism), 
and a score of 4 was given for a coverage of more than 86 percent (high degree of uni-
versalism). Income-test-based programs were scored equal to 0, as they do not grant 
automatic universal rights. Finally, for benefit differentiation, a score of 0 was given for 
a standard benefit of less than 55 percent of maximum benefits (very high benefit dif-
ferentials), a score of 2 was given for a ratio between 55 and 80 percent (medium bene-
fit differentials), and a score of 4 was given for a ratio above 80 percent (low benefit 
differentials).17 
  
                                                 
17 For a clustering of welfare states according to conservative, liberal and social-democratic regime attrib-
utes, see Esping-Andersen 1990, Table 3.3 on page 74. 
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Appendix III: Evolution of China’s public social expenditure 
 
Appendix III: Evolution of China’s public social expenditure, 2010-2015 
 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Education 26271.88 23041.70 22001.76 21242.10 16497.33 12550.02 
Healthcare 11953.18 10176.80 8279.90 7245.11 6429.51 4804.18 
Social secu-
rity and 
employment 
aid 
19018.69 15968.90 14490.54 12585.52 11109.40 9130.62 
Total 57243.75 49186.80 44772.2 41071.73 34036.24 26484.82 
as % of 
GPD 
8.3% 7.6% 7.5% 7.6% 6.9% 6.4% 
GPD 689052.1 643974.0 595244.4 540367.4 489300.6 413030.3 
Note: Data refer to national government expenditure (in 100 million yuan). 
Source: NBSC (2016). 
 
Appendix IV: Developments in social insurance participation of mi-
grant workers 
Appendix IV: Developments in social insurance participation of migrant workers 
 2007 2008 2010 
 
2015 Coverage rate1 
Pension insurance 18 million 24 million 33 million 56 million 23% 
Health insurance 31 million 43 million 46 million 51 million 21% 
Unemployment insurance 12 million n/a 20 million 42 million 17% 
1 Percentage of migrant population (247 million in 2015) that is covered under the relevant social 
insurance program at the end of 2015. 
Sources: Cai (2011) and MoHRSS (2016). 
 
